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BEYOND THE LIABILITY WALL: STRENGTHENING TORT
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Noah Sachs
Despite decades of effort, the international community has stumbled in
attempts to craft tort remedies for victims of transboundary environmental
damage. More than a dozen civil liability treaties have been negotiated
that create causes of action and prescribe liability rules, but few have entered
into force, and most remain unadapted orphans in international environmental law. In this Article, I explain the problematic record of tort
liability regimes by developing a theoretical model of liability negotiations
grounded in regime theory from political science. Based on this model, I
conclude that negotiated liability regimes have foundered because of three
main roadblocks: ( 1) interest conflicts between developed and developing
states; (2) high transaction costs and low expected payoffs; and (3) incorporation of treaty provisions that are too onerous for states to accept. I conclude that strengthening tort remedies wiU require changing the substantive
content of liability treaties and the process of negotiating them. I also show
how liability principles can be strengthened outside the treaty-making process through diffusion of norms against trans boundary environmental damage.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past four decades, states have discussed, deliberated, and
debated how to strengthen tort liability principles within international
environmental law. In declarations, conference reports, and treaties, states
have committed to make liability work for the environment, both as a
means of deterring harmful activities and as a means of compensating
parties injured by transboundary pollution.
Despite these ambitious pronouncements, states' actual accomplish}
ments in the liability field have been quite meager. States have been
unwilling to accept treaty language that would impose liability for
1
transboundary pollution on states directly (so-called state liability). In
the realm of private international law, which is the focus of this
Article, states have also rejected most civil liability treaties establishing
2
the tort liability of private actors for transboundary pollution. Effective
1.
See RENE LEFEBER, TRANSBOUNDAR Y ENVIRONMENTAL INTERFERENCE AND THE
ORIGIN OF STATE LIABILITY 299 nn.242-43 (1996); see also Thomas Gehring & Markus
Jachtenfuchs, Liability for Transboundary Environmental Damage: Towards a General Liability
Regime?, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 92, 106 (1993) ("There is no indication ... that [states) are now
ready to accept a convention imposing on them a general international liability for
transnational environmental damage."). For a discussion of the drawbacks of state liability
as a vehicle for strengthening tort principles in international environmental law, see Jutta
Brunnee, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Liability Regimes as Tools for
Environmental Protection, 53 lNT'L & COMP. L.Q. 351 (2004 ).
2.
I use "transboundary" pollution as a broad term that encompasses two distinct
types of pollution. First, it refers to the flow of pollution (through watercourses, oceans, or
the air and atmosphere) from a source state to an affected state. Second, it refers to pollution
caused by international trade in hazardous materials. In the second sense of the term, the
activities that can cause environmental damage, such as transport, management, and disposal of
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tort liability rules, it seems, are the Yeti of international environmental
law-pursued for years, sometimes spotted in rough outlines, but remarkably elusive in practice.
Of the fourteen major civil liability treaties that have been adopted
in the environmental field since 1960, only six have ever entered into
3
force, and actual claims for compensation under these treaties are scarce.
Civil liability treaties are designed to harmonize private tort law across
jurisdictions for specified types of transboundary environmental damage.
They usually contain rules regarding which actors can be held financially
responsible, the underlying type of liability (strict or fault-based), procedures for bringing claims, caps on damages, and insurance requirements. However, with so many stillborn treaties, the practical impact of
civil liability treaties on enhancing tort remedies has been negligible.
Notably, not a single major civil liability treaty outside the contexts of
oil spills and nuclear accidents has entered into force, each having fallen
far short of the number of necessary ratifications. They remain dead
letters, or as the United Nations Environment Programme more delicately
put it, they have fallen into a "spell of dormancy." 4
The lack of widely ratified liability rules has serious consequences
for deterrence, accountability, compensation of victims, and the global
environment. Without specific treaties setting the ground rules for tort
suits, individuals harmed by transboundary pollution have few viable
avenues for redress because of what I call "liability walls"-procedural
hurdles to bringing transnational tort suits. Firms causing transboundary
pollution (whether by air, water, or disposal of hazardous wastes) are
protected by these liability walls and can continue to externalize environmental damage to other countries.
The absence of effective remedies is highlighted by the illegal dumping in August 2006 of 528 tons of caustic hazardous waste in villages in the

the materials, usually occur in the affected state or on the high seas, and the source state is a
source only because the materials originated there and were loaded onto some mode of transport
(rail, truck, or ship) there. See KATHARINA KUMMER, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF
HAZARDOUS WASTES: THE BASEL CONVENTION AND RELATED LEGAL RULES 15 ( 1995).
3.
See infra Part l.C. Even after Chernobyl, the most serious transboundary pollution incident in recent decades, there were no successful claims against the plant operator or the
Soviet Union. See Gunther Hand!, Transboundary Nuclear Accidents: The Post-Chernobyl
Multilateral Legislative Agenda, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 203, 223 (1988).
4.
U.N. Env't Programme [UNEP], Liability and Compensation Regimes Related to
Environmental Damage 63 (2002) [hereinafter UNEP], http://www.unep.org/DEPI/programmes/
Liability-compen-papers.pdf.
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Ivory Coast. The waste was off-loaded by a Greek-owned tanker flying
a Panamanian flag and leased by the London branch of a Swiss trading
6
corporation, Trafigura, whose physical headquarters are in the Netherlands.
The toxic sludge caused at least eight deaths and dozens of hospitalizations.7 With the existing barriers to international tort litigation, it is
unlikely that injured villagers will receive any monetary compensation
8
from culpable parties.
Surprisingly, international law scholars have largely overlooked the
lack of ratifications of civil liability treaties and have instead engaged in
micro-level analysis of individual treaties, examining design issues such
as the choice between strict liability and fault-based liability, the types of
environmental harm that should trigger liability, channeling of liability to certain operators, and the implications of governmental permits for
9
private liability. But expertly designed treaties have little relevance if
they do not attract adherents, and only a handful of scholars have mentioned the lack of entry into force as a significant problem in this field
10
of law.
The record of treaty failure should raise more fundamental
5.
See Lydia Polgreen & Marlise Simons, Global Sludge Ends in Tragedy for Ivory Coast,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2006, at Al.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
In February 2007, Trafigura agreed to pay the government of the Ivory Coast $197 million to obtain the release ofTrafigura executives who were seized inside the country after the dumping incident. Trafigura did not acknowledge any liability under international law or the domestic
law of the Ivory Coast, and it is not clear whether any of this money will reach the injured
villagers. See Lydia Polgreen & Marlise Simons, Oil Company to Pay $200 Million in Toxic
Dumping in Ivory Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at A6.
9.
See UNEP, supra note 4, at 44-61 (cataloging major soft-law and treary instruments
relating to environmental liability and synthesizing their main features); Hague Conference on
Private International Law, Apr. 2000, Civil Liability Resulting From Transfrontier Environmental
Damage: A Case for the Hague Conference? 5-16, Preliminary Doc. 8 (prepared by Christophe
Bernasconi), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gen_pd8e.pdf [hereinafter Hague
Conference] (cataloging treaties and outlining provisions); Betsy Baker Raben, Civil Liability as a
Control Mechanism for Environmental Protection at the International Level, in INTERNATIONAL,
REGIONAL, AND NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 821, 825-43 (Fred L. Morrison & Rudiger
Wolfrum eds., 2000); Alfonso Ascencio; The Transboundary Movement of Living Modified
Organisms: Issues Relating to Liability and Compensation, 6 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L
ENVTL. L. 293 ( 1997); Sam Blay & Julia Green, The Development of a Liability Annex to the Madrid
Protocol, 25 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 1, 24 (1995); Michael Faure & Wang Hui, The International
Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: Are They Effective?, 12 REV. EUR.
COMMUNITY & !NT'L ENVTL. L. 3 (2003).
10.
See Robin Churchill, Facilitating (Transnational) Civil Liability Litigation for
Environmental Damage by Means of Treaties: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, 12 Y.B. INT'L
ENVTL. L. 3, 41 (2001) (noting that the most "obvious" weakness of civil liability treaties is that
"most [of the treaties] are not in force" or widely ratified); Anne Daniel, Civil Liability
Regimes as a Complement to Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Sound International
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questions: What accounts for the problematic history of civil liability in
the environmental field? Why are stronger tort remedies so often resisted
by diverse groups of states? How can we establish more widely shared
norms governing responsibility for international environmental harms?
Departing from the narrower inquiries of prior legal literature, I
address these questions through developing a macro-level model of how
states negotiate over private law liability rules for environmental damage. The model presented here adopts rationalist assumptions of state
11
behavior and draws heavily on regime theory from political science.
The model illustrates the underlying interests of states in protecting
their domestic constituents, the expected payoffs for states to cooperate
on harmonized tort rules, and the reasons why this area of law has been
characterized by frequent conflict.
This Article is the first to model the dynamics of regime formation
for environmental liability rules, as opposed to regime formation for controlling ongoing pollution, which has been an occasional subject of prior
12
This Article
regime theory literature and international law scholarship.
also explains why this field of law has been characterized by nonregimes
13
rather than by successful instances of cooperation.
I present the
overall ratification record of civil liability treaties, the breakdown of
parties among developed and developing states, and new self-reporting
by states regarding their reasons for nonratification.
Based on my model, I conclude that there are three main reasons for
the problematic record of tort liability in international environmental law.
First, intense interest conflicts between developed states and developing
Policy or False Comfort?, 12 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 225, 236 (2003)
(noting that lack of entry into force "is the empirical reality that international policy makers
must take into account").
11.
Regime theory is the study of the conditions under which nations will cooperate to form
regimes and the role of regimes once established, in shaping state behavior. See I. William Zartman,
Negotiating the Rapids: The Dynamics of Regime Formation, in GETTING IT DONE: POSTAGREEMENT
NEGOTIATION AND INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 13, 19 (Bertman l. Spector & l. William
Zartman eds., 2003) [hereinafter GETTING IT DoNE] (questioning whether "regimes shape state
behavior, or [] states simply do what they can and want"); Stephan Haggard & Beth A. Simmons,
Theories of International Regimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491, 492 (1987) (addressing whether regimes
"matter" as an "independent influence on state behavior").
See, e.g., Detlef Sprinz & Tapani Vaahroranta, The Interest-Based Explanation of
12.
International Environmental Policy, 48 INT'L ORG. 77 (1994).
13.
Radoslav Dimitrov defines "nonregime" as a "public policy arena characterized by
the absence of an interstate policy agreement where states have either tried and failed to create
one, or when governments have not even initiated negotiations." RADOSLAV S. DIMITROV,
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: REGIMES AND NONREGIMES IN
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 9 (2006) (emphasis omitted).
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states with respect to liability rules have generated acrimony and distrust.
Developed states, seeking to protect domestic firms and maintain liability
walls, have been the primary opponents of new civil liability rules for
transboundary environmental damage and have largely kept liability
off the international environmental agenda. Second, multilateral discussions on new liability rules involve high transaction costs associated
with coordinating the interests and legal systems of dozens of states, yet
transboundary environmental injuries, when they occur, usually involve
two or perhaps only a handful of states. This asymmetry provides a
powerful disincentive to harmonizing liability rules on an ex ante basis.
Finally, adoption of civil liability rules has been frustrated by treaty
provisions that are too onerous for states to accept. States have reported
that high liability limits, difficulties in obtaining required insurance, and
conflicts with domestic law have been severe obstacles to cooperation
on negotiated tort remedies.
How should we remedy the lack of remedies? The key question for
proponents of strengthening the role of tort liability in international environmental law is whether to continue to rely on treaty-based mechanisms
for harmonizing domestic tort law or whether to strengthen liability
principles outside the treaty process. I argue that a mix of treaty and
non treaty strategies is needed. Treaty making should not be abandoned,
but it should be reformed through layering of individual liability with
compensation funds, and it should be conducted on a regional basis to
facilitate regime formation. Outside the treaty context, we need to establish a clear norm that firms causing environmental damage across a
border should not be able to use that border as a legal shield. Such a norm
might emerge as a result of high-profile suits under existing domestic
law, decisions of international tribunals, governmental pronouncements,
or nonbinding declarations. The spread of human rights norms through
a transnational legal process involving domestic and international
actors can serve as a model for how rules for environmental liability might
14
be established.
14.
This Article does not address a class of torts in which environmental harm occurs abroad,
entirely within the borders of one country, and foreign plaintiffs sue a corporation in the United
States on theories of veil piercing or operational control over a subsidiary. See generally XUE
HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2003). Suits under the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), related to environmental damage often fall under this
category. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Beanal v. FreeportMcMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). Such suits have a transnational character, but there
is no transboundary movement of pollution across borders, and these suits are not governed by the
major treaties in the civil liability field. For an article that discusses global developments in this
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This Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I discuss the gap between
states' rhetorical commitment to enhancing the role of tort in international environmental law and what states have actually accomplished.
Normatively, I argue that private law tort remedies should play a stronger
role in international environmental governance, even as the primary
response to international environmental problems must remain prevention efforts grounded in public law. In Part II, I outline a theoretical
model for how states negotiate over liability rules for transboundary
environmental damage and then present, in more detail, the three principal reasons for prior failures to establish private tort remedies through
civil liability treaties. In Part III, I shift to a discussion of reform proposals, showing the various treaty and nontreaty tools that should be
deployed to enhance the role of tort in international environmental
law in the future.

I.

TORT REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
EXPECTATIONS AND REALITY

In an era when international environmental law has become bureaucratized through U.N. agencies, multilateral treaties, and massive diplomatic
conferences, it is easy to overlook the centrality of liability and litigation in
the origins of the field. In this Part, I trace the consistent international
interest in tort remedies and explain why the international community has
negotiated specific treaties to enhance tort remedies, rather than just relying
on existing domestic legal procedures. I also outline the negotiation and
ratification history of civil liability treaties, illustrating the persistent
problems of regime formation that have plagued this area of law.
A.

International Interest in Tort Remedies forT ransboundary
Environmental Damage

Issues of compensation and redress were paramount in early international environmental negotiations. Liability for environmental harm was
a central concern of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment, the founding text of international environmental law, which
called on states to "co-operate to develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and
type of litigation, see Halina Ward, Governing Multinationals: The Role of Foreign Direct
Liability (Feb. 2001) (Royal Institute of International Affairs Briefing Paper No. 18).
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15

other environmental damage .... " Echoing the Stockholm Declaration,
the 1992 Rio Declaration (adopted by consensus by more than 175 countries, including the United States) reiterated the need for states to cooperate "in an expeditious and more determined manner" to develop
16
"international law regarding liability and compensation."
Neither of
these declarations specified whether stronger rules about financial liability for environmental damage should be implemented through public
law (holding states responsible) or private law (holding culpable private
actors responsible through tort law). In practice, however, states have
overwhelmingly turned to strengthening private international law remedies. The impetus for private international law remedies often came from
serious accidents, such as the Torrey Canyon oil spill in the North Sea in
17
1967, and innumerable negotiations and discussions have occurred since
18
the late 1960s to craft such remedies through treaty text.
Multilateral
negotiations over private liability rules have occurred against an ecological backdrop of pervasive transnational environmental externalities
in areas such as air pollution, ocean contamination, hazardous waste shipments, climate change, and the spread of invasive species and toxic
19
chemicals. Globalization has not only tied national economies together,
it has also resulted in a web of exports and imports of environmental risks.
As a result of consistent interest (particularly among developing states)
in establishing stronger tort remedies for environmental harms, private law
liability rules have become a key battleground of environmental diplomacy. Indeed, few international environmental agreements "can be
negotiated today without running across the liability issue in one way
20
or another."
15.
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972,
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 22, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.48/14/REV.1 (June 16, 1972).
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14,
16.
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 13, U.N. Doc. NCONF.151/26 (Vol.
1) (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
17.
The Torrey Canyon accident was followed by the adoption, in 1969, of the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969,973 U.N.T.S. 3.
18.
See Churchill, supra note 10, at 29-31 (listing treaties that call for the development of
further liability regimes).
See MARLA CONE, SILENT SNOW: THE SLOW POISONING OF THE ARCfiC (2005)
19.
(discussing the spread of toxic chemicals from North America and Europe to the native peoples
of the Arctic); SPECIES INVASIONS: INSIGHTS INTO EcoLOGY, EVOLlJfiON AND BIOGEOGRAPHY
(Dov F. Sax eta!. eds., 2005) (detailing the effects of the transcontinental spread of invasive species);
Warren Cornwall, An Import From Asia: Bad Air, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 21, 2006, at A1 (reporting
on effects of Chinese air pollution on the northwestern United States).
20.
Brunnee, supra note 1, at 351.
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What accounts for this consistent interest in developing stronger tort
remedies? Tort has three major benefits for environmental governance.
First, tort damages can provide pollution victims with compensation after
major transboundary environmental accidents or pollution flows, such as
oil spills on the high seas, chemical contamination of rivers or lakes, or
industrial accidents that release toxins into the air. While governments
may, in some cases, take criminal or regulatory action against culpable
parties, tort provides a monetary remedy that can directly assist the victims of the pollution, and particularly victims who reside outside the
jurisdiction where the harm originated. Moreover, tort could be a
plaintiffs only resort against a polluting firm where state regulation of the
firm's activities is weak or has been corrupted because of bribery or
21
political influence.
Second, more robust cross-border tort remedies could have a deterrent
effect by forcing firms to internalize both the cost of any transboundary
22
environmental damage and the cost of preventive measures. Tort remedies are an accountability mechanism to ensure a check on corporate conduct, to provide incentives to take precautionary measures, and to avoid
"unjust enrichment" by companies that benefit from global economic activity while externalizing environmental consequences beyond national borders.23 It is not surprising that interest in enhancing private tort remedies
for environmental damage developed in tandem with the growing interna24
tional acceptance of the polluter pays principle in the 1970s and 1980s.
Indeed, an effective tort remedy for pollution damages is the most concrete manifestation of the polluter pays principle.
Third, tort law can act as a regulatory device by filling in gaps in the
major public law environmental treaties. Existing treaties that govern
shipments of hazardous waste, safety of nuclear reactors and industrial
21.
See PATRICIA BIRNIE & ALAN BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 268 (2002).
22.
See Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is
Tort Law the Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 399, 408-D9 (2002) (summarizing benefits of tort
litigation to address environmental damage, and noting that, in addition to compensation of
the victim and specific deterrence of the culpable parry, tort awards will have a more general
deterrent effect by sending price signals to other actors in the industry). But see Sanford E.
Gaines, International Principles for Transnational Environmental Liability: Can Developments
in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse?, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 311, 324-29 (1989) (arguing
that the goals of compensation and deterrence are often in conflict and questioning the value of
liability in deterring and changing industry-wide practices).
23.
See Ascencio, supra note 9, at 295.
24.
See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 21, at 92-93, 268; see also U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development, supra note 16, at princ. 16.
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facilities, use of watercourses or regional seas, and other areas of environmental cooperation might fail to prevent environmental damage for numerous reasons. The damage may have been of a type unforeseen by the treaty
negotiators, the treaty might contain weak initial commitments, there might
be widespread noncompliance, or states may lack regulatory power, or fail
to use their power, to control transboundary pollution originating in their
borders. Treaties as a whole may be underenforced in an anarchic interna25
tional system that lacks an authoritative judicial organ. Tort liability, in
theory, could remedy these weaknesses by providing private law avenues
for compensation and redress. "In this way, private litigators contribute to
[a] larger regulatory system, thereby producing a public good while pur26
suing their private aims."
Reflecting this complementary function of tort law, most negotiations
over civil liability rules for environmental damage have been conducted as
a follow-up to negotiations on initial treaties that I will refer to in this Article
as "primary" treaties. Primary treaties usually impose prospective obligations
on governments to prevent environmental harm or manage shared resources,
and they do not contain any private right of action to enforce their provisions
or to seek damages. Primary treaties, in short, are regulatory treaties.
Conventions setting baseline standards for nuclear safety or governmental
informed-consent procedures for hazardous waste shipments are typical
examples. Liability rules governing whom can be sued, the types of damage that will trigger liability, and caps on damages are then negotiated as
adjuncts to the primary treaty. These harmonized domestic tort rules thus
27
establish private rights of action if environmental harm does occur.
Liability rules should play a secondary, backup role to the primary
treaties. Complex ecological problems cannot be addressed through tort
alone, and solutions will require sustained cooperation among governments, additional funding, and new regulatory commitments. Prevention of
harm should be the primary focus of international environmental law, and
many environmental problems, such as long-range transport of air pollu28
tion, are not easily addressed through litigation.
25.
See generally Jon Hovi & lvar Areklett, Enforcing the Climate Regime: Game Theory and
the Marrakesh Accords, 4 lNT'L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2004).
26.
Anderson, supra note 22, at 409.
27.
The relationship between liability rules and primary environmental treaties is discussed
in more detail in Part Ill.
See Phoebe Okowa, The Legacy of Trail Smelter in the Field of Transboundary Air
28.
Pollution, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL
SMELTER ARBITRATION 198 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Millers eds., 2006) (noting the
difficulty of establishing a causal nexus to specific sources where air pollution is regional).
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Conceding the secondary role of liability in environmental governance does not eviscerate tort's continued importance, however. Harmonizing tort law across jurisdictions for specific types of environmental
damage has one very significant advantage in comparison to primary treaties: Judgments in civil suits for transboundary environmental damage can
be enforced by national courts, giving them real bite. National courts have
a panoply of mechanisms at their disposal to enforce judgments and attach
19
assets. A civil liability treaty empowering national courts to address
transboundary environmental damage therefore relies on existing sovereign authority for enforcement and implementation. Government-togovernment dispute resolution in primary treaties, in contrast, is notoriously
cumbersome and lacks compulsory enforcement mechanisms. While many
environmental treaties contain dispute resolution procedures, they have
rarely been used in practice, and governments are unlikely to expend
diplomatic capital on transboundary pollution cases ex post, except in
30
extraordinary circumstances of major environmental damage.
Tart
remedies, on the other hand, do not require extensive governmental
expenditures, other than creating the remedies in the first place and
operating a court system to hear cases. As Peter Sand of the University of
Munich put it: "Instead of internationalizing a local issue (via an enormous
detour to the respective national capitals)," civil liability has the advantage of "adapt[ing] local decision-making processes so that they can
31
handle transfrontier problems like ordinary local ones of comparable size."
29.
There is an extensive literature on the positive role that national courts can play in enforcing international law. See, e.g., ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DoMESTIC
COURTS (Benedetto Conforty & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997); INTERNATIONAL LAW
DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996); Karen
Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501
(2000); Harold Hongju Koh, How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L.J.
1397 (1999); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcement and the Success of International Environmental
Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 47, 57-64 (1995).
30.
See Charles Phillips, Nordic Co-Operation for the Protection of the Environment Against
Air Pollution and the Possibility of Transboundary Private Litigation, in TRANSBOUNDARY AIR
POLLUTION 153, 164 (C. Flinterman et a!. eds., 1986) (arguing that addressing transboundary
pollution through public law mechanisms, "elevates the issue to the level of state responsibiliry
where the question of whether a state's sovereignry has been invaded overshadows the interests of the individual in receiving adequate compensation.").
31.
Peter Sand, The Role of Domestic Procedures in Transnational Disputes, in LEGAL ASPECTS
OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 146 (H. van Edig ed., 1977), reprinted in TRANSNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: LESSONS IN GLOBAL CHANGE 87, 97 (53 Int'l Law & Policy Series,
1997). Even with resort to existing courts, we should not underestimate the transaction costs
of bringing mass tort litigation. It is an expensive and lengthy process even in the best of
circumstances. Gunther Hand!, International Accountability for Transboundary Harm Revisited:
What Role for State Liability?, 37 ENVT'L POL. & L. 116, 119 (2007).
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Liability Walls and the Pursuit of Negotiated Liability Regimes

Why have states turned to specialized multilateral treaties to establish
ton remedies for transboundary environmental damage? After all, if domestic tort remedies are available for cases of domestic property damage or
personal injury, then plaintiffs injured by transboundary pollution might
simply rely on existing law and procedures in national courts (whether in
their home state or in the source state) to vindicate their interests.
Suits under domestic law for transboundary environmental damage
have been exceedingly difficult to prosecute, however, due to robust and
persistent procedural hurdles to transboundary tort litigation. The hurdles
include obtaining personal jurisdiction over foreign firms, extraterritorial
service of process, the local action rule (which provides that actions in ton for
32
damages to real property must be brought where the property is located),
33
resolving choice of law questions, overcoming motions to dismiss on the
grounds of forum non conveniens, deciding whether a defendant's gov4
ernmental permit is relevant to its tort liability/ and enforcing judgments.35 For pollution that flows across borders, the locus delicti, or place
of the tort, is often hotly disputed. Added to these legal barriers is the
practical problem of the expense of bringing suit against a foreign entity and
36
proving its negligence. For the 2.8 billion individuals living in developing
37
countries on incomes of less than $2 per day, access to transnational tort
remedies may, as a practical matter, be unattainable.
Together, these legal hurdles form what I call a liability wall-a set
of legal barriers that serves to insulate domestic firms from foreign suits over

32.
See Hague Conference, supra note 9, at 50-53.
33.
For a survey of different approaches to choice of law rules in transnational litigation, see
Said Mahmoudi, Some Private International Law Aspects of Transboundary Environmental Disputes, 59
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 128, 132-34 (1990). Courts have applied a variety of doctrines, including
applying the law of the place where the wrongful act was committed, the place where the damage
was suffered, or the so-called "center of gravity" or "most significant Ielationship" tests. Sand, supra
note 31, at 120. Some European courts have adopted the principle of Gunstigkeits-Prinzip, or applying
the state's law that is most favorable to the plaintiff. See id.
See Hague Conference, supra note 9, at 40-44.
34.
35.
If a plaintiff sues in his or her home court, where the environmental damage occurred,
the state hosting the polluting industry may refuse to enforce the foreign judgment. XUE HANQIN,
supra note 14, at 104-05.
36.
See Org. of Am. States, Annual Report of the Inter-American Juridical Committee w the
General Assembly, 126--38, OEA Doc. OEA/Ser. Q/V1.34 CJI/doc.l45/03 (Aug. 29, 2003), available
at http://www.oas.org/cji/eng/INFOANUAL.CJ1.2003.1NG.pdf. See also Hague Conference, supra
note 9, at 40-44.
37.
See Barbara Crossette, U.N. Report Says New Democracies Falter, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2002, at AS.
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environmental damage. The impact of liability walls is severe: "Potential
claimants are likely to be reluctant to sue in the unfamiliar and perhaps
unfriendly courts of the actors causing the harm, and defendants will resist
38
appearing in the courts of the victims." It is beyond the scope of this
paper to detail all of these procedural barriers to transnational tort litiga39
tion, and other scholars have addressed these barriers at great length.
But prior scholarship has not connected the presence of liability walls to a
state's incentive to ratify or not ratify a civil liability treaty, and I discuss
these incentives in Part II. Moreover, scholars need to do more than identify the hurdles to transnational litigation: We need solutions for getting
beyond liability walls.
For present purposes, the important point is that the decentralized alternative of resting on domestic procedures has not proven to be satisfactory
4
for strengthening tort remedies internationally. ° Consequently, states have
repeatedly pursued the option of negotiating specific treaties that surmount
liability walls through lowering barriers to tort suits. The resulting civil
liability treaties are an unusual legal hybrid. They are negotiated among
governments and are interpreted as public law treaties, but they are designed
41
to establish and set the terms of liability for private actors. The ultimate
implementation of the treaties is left to domestic courts. Civil liability for
environmental damage therefore cannot be identified solely as an issue of
42
international law or of domestic law-it is truly transnational.
Broadly speaking, the civil liability treaties that have been adopted
have three main functions. First, they ensure nondiscriminatory treatment
of foreign plaintiffs and provide equal access to national procedures and
38.
John H. Knox, The Flawed Trail Smelter Procedure: The Wrong Tribunal, the Wrong
Parties, and the Wrong Law, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS
FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION, supra note 28, at 66, 68.
39.
See, e.g., Hague Conference, supra note 9, at 26--69; Anderson, supra note 22; Shi-Ling
Hsu & Austen L. Parrish, Utigating Canada-U.S. Transboundary Harm: International Environmental
Lawmaking and the Threat of Extraterritorial Reciprocity, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 32-57 (2007); Sand,
supra note 31.
40.
See THOMAS GEHRING, DYNAMIC INTERNATIONAL REGIMES: INSTITUTIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 15 (Martin Fi.ihr & Gerhard Roller eds., 1994)
("[E]stablishment of international regimes is not a goal in itself. As long as decentralized and
uncoordinated decision-making yields satisfactory outcomes, regimes will be of limited service.").
See Gunther Hand! & Roberr E. Lutz, An International Policy Perspective on the Trade of
41.
Hazardous Materials and Technologies, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 351,358 (1989).
42.
See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 745,
745 (2006). Koh quotes the definition of transnational law provided by Phillip jessup: "[A]ll law
which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers ... [including] [b]oth public and
private international law ... [plus] other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories." ld.
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remedies for resolving tort disputes.
Second, they address problems of
jurisdiction, choice of law, and enforcement of judgments by setting
internationally agreed standards for where suits can be brought, which
state's law will apply, and how judgments can be enforced through attachment of assets or mutual recognition of judicial decrees. 44 Third, the
treaties harmonize the substance of liability law for suits arising out of
activity covered by the treaty. All of the treaties have substantive provisions regarding the standard of liability, limitations on damages, insurance
requirements, defenses, and channeling of liability (the important issue of
who can be sued). To establish the strict liability of industrial operators to
set a monetary limit on claims, for example, a civil liability treaty may
require parties to change their domestic liability law to reflect the harmonized rules of the treaty. 45 Harmonizing the substantive tort law helps to
avoid conflicts of law problems for damages covered by the treaty.
Imposing strict liability for transboundary environmental harm has
become a default principle in civil liability negotiations. It is a starting
assumption of negotiators and has been incorporated into all of the civil
liability treaties adopted since 1989.46 An internationally agreed standard of
strict liability for covered activities is probably the principal means through
which a civil liability treaty could facilitate transnational litigation and
improve a plaintiffs prospects for redress.

43.
See, e.g., Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Dec. 10, 1999, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/CHW.5/29 [hereinafter Basel Liability Protocol).
44.
See Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), art. 20, Oct. 10, 1989, U.N.
Doc. ECE{fRANS/79, available at http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/cnd_e.doc
[hereinafter CRTD Convention); Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy, art. 13d, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 263; International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 17, at art. X {providing that validly entered judgments enforceable under the law of the state of origin that are no longer subject to ordinary review are to be
recognized by other parties if the first court had proper jurisdiction); International Convention
on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection With the Carriage of Hazardous and
Noxious Substances by Sea, art. 40, May 3, 1996, IMD Doc. Leg./CONF. 10/8/2, 35 l.L.M. 1406
(May 9, 1996) [hereinafter HNS Convention]. Most of the civil liability treaties have some
provision for mutual recognition of judgments, subject to narrow exceptions such as judgments
obtained by fraud or where enforcement would contravene clearly established public policy. For
examples of these provisions, see LEFEBER, supra note 1, at 267 n.136.
45.
See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 21, at 268--69. A treaty imposing strict liability would
supersede (or require changes to) any domestic legislation that requires a plaintiff to prove fault.
In addition to the widespread application of strict liability, many of the treaties also harmonize
domestic liability law by imposing joint and several liability in situations where more than one
party is culpable. Id.
46.
Churchill, supra note 10, at 34.
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Fourteen major civil liability treaties have been adopted in the environmental field since 1960, and the particular kind of damage covered
47
by each treaty varies widely.
"Environmental damage" usually includes
traditional injuries to health or property caused by long-term flows of
pollution or by sudden accidents. It also includes, in some of the newer
civil liability treaties, categories such as economic loss due to contamination (for example, fishermen's loss of catch after an oil spill), the cost
of protective measures to prevent further damage to resources after a pol48
lution incident occurs, and the cost of restoring damaged resources.
The treaties that have been completed to date are highly sectoral,
targeting specific industrial or transport activities such as transport of certain regulated hazardous substances by road or rail, transport of hazardous
wastes by ship, or industrial accidents on transboundary watercourses. This
narrow targeting can leave wide gaps in coverage for many types of environmental damage. Injuries from transport of hazardous waste in inter49
national commerce are addressed by the Basel Liability Protocol, for
example, whereas an accident from improper management of hazardous
waste near a border may not be covered by any treaty. Human error causing a landslide or flood that crosses a border would likely not be covered
by any of the civil liability treaties. While the sectoral nature of the treaties
has clear drawbacks, states have simply been unwilling to agree on more
generalized principles of liability for trans boundary environmental damage. 5°

4 7.
See treaties listed infra tbl.l.
48.
There is still considerable controversy over whether civil liability treaties should apply to
damage to the global commons (such as the high seas) or to ecological damage unrelated to property
values (such as destruction of wetlands on private property where the loss of wetlands has no
impact on the market value of the property). For a fuller discussion, see LEFEBER, supra note 1, at 9;
Anderson, supra note 22, at 410 (Tort litigation is "downright clumsy and inflexible in making
awards for environmental goods and processes outside the market."); Brian Jones, Deterring,
Compensating, and Remedying Environmental Damage: The Contribution of Tort Liability, in HARM
TO THE ENVIRONMENT: THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 11,
17-19 (Peter Wetterstein ed., 1997).
49.
See Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43.
50.
The treaty that comes closest to doing so, the 1993 Lugano Convention on Civil Liability
for Damage Resulting From Activities Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 l.L.M.
1228, a regional treaty adopted by the Council of Europe, has not attracted any ratifications in fifteen years. See A.E. Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and
International Law, 17 J. ENVTL. L. 3, 16 (2005) (discussing reasons for the lack of success of the
Lugano Convention).
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The Problematic Track Record of Civil Liability Treaties

Despite decades of efforts, civil liability treaties have rarely entered
into force and have therefore foundered as vehicles to establish viable
remedies for transboundary environmental damage. Given the consistent
rhetorical commitment to enhance liability rules and the numerous efforts
to negotiate liability treaties, the lack of actual accomplishments in this
area of law is striking and deserves further investigation. As positive law, the
treaties have been largely impotent, with a negligible impact on
resolving actual disputes.
Table 1 brings together years of data on negotiations, ratifications, and
entry into force of civil liability treaties. The first column in Table 1 provides the name of the treaty. The second column in Table 1 provides the
year of adoption-when the treaty text was agreed to by negotiators, usu51
ally by consensus, and opened for signature. The third column in Table
1 indicates the number of signatures on the treaty since adoption. Signature
on a treaty authenticates the treaty text as the final text that was adopted
and indicates the support of the signer, such as a foreign minister or head of
state, but signature alone usually does not signify a state's consent to be
52
bound by the terms of the treaty. The fourth column in Table 1 shows the
number of ratifications of the treaty. Through ratification, a state formally
declares its intention to be bound by the terms of the treaty upon entry into
53
force of that treaty. In many states, ratification cannot proceed until
domestic procedures for approving treaties have been satisfied, such as
the "advice and consent" of two-thirds of the Senate in the United States.
Frequently, a signatory state may choose not to become a ratifying party
54
to t h e treaty.
Finally, the last two columns in Table 1 indicate the relationship
between ratification and entry into force, which is the point at which the
treaty imposes binding obligations on all parties who have ratified. The civil
51.
The process of adopting, signing, and ratifying treaties is governed by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 9-18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Entry into force is governed by Article 24. See id. at art. 24.
For a narrative overview of these steps, see HUNTER, SALZMAN & ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 305--09 (2007).
52.
See HUNTER, SALZMAN &ZAELKE, supra note 51, at 306. Under the Vienna Convention,
signature on a treaty obligates the state to refrain from acts "which would defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty."
Vienna Convention, supra note 51, art. 18.
53.
A ratifying state usually deposits a document stating that intention with the United
Nations or the treaty secretariat, thereby becoming a formal party to the treaty.
54.
See infra Part II.B.
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liability treaties in Table 1 all provide that entry into force occurs upon
some minimum number of ratifications.
As Table 1 illustrates, most of the treaties have not received sufficient
ratifications to enter into force. Of the fourteen major civil liability treaties
listed in Table 1, only six have entered into force, and these six were all in
the fields of liability for oil spills and nuclear accidents. The repeated
attempts to negotiate liability treaties in other fields have been a clear
55
failure, leaving a yawning gap in coverage.

55.

See Hague Conference, supra note 9, at 15.
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TABLE 1: STATUS OF CiVIL LIABILITY TREATIES ADOPTED SINCE 1960

Treaty

Paris Convention
on Third Party
Liability in the
Field of Nuclear
Energy
•Amending
protocol
•Amending
protocol
•Amending
protocol
Supplementary
Convention
•Amending
protocol
•Amending
protocol
•Amending
protocol
Convention on
the Liability of
Operators of
Nuclear Shij2S
IAEA Vienna
Convention on
Civil Liability
for Nuclear
Damage
•Amending
rotocol

56

Year of
Adoption

Number of
Signatures

Number of
Ratifications

Ratifications
Necessary for
Entry Into
Force

Entry
Into
Force

1960

18

15

5

1968

1964

16

14

5

1968

1982

14

11

5

1991

2004

16

0

5

Not
in
Force

1963

16

12

6

1974

1964

13

12

6

1974

1982

14

11

6

1988

2004

13

0

6

Not
in
Force

1962

16

6

2

Not
in
Force

1963

14

33

5

2003

1997

15

5

5

2003

56.
Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal, Can., May 25-27, 2005, Status of ThirdParty Liability Treaties and Analysis of Difficulties Facing Their Entry Into Force, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD//BS/WG-L&R/1/INF/3 (Apr. 15, 2005), avaikzble at https://www.biodiv.org/doc/
meetings/bs/bswglr-01/information/bswglr-01-inf-03-en.pdf [hereinafter Convention on Biological
Diversiry]. Ratifications for oil pollution damage treaties compiled from "The International Regime
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage" {January 2008), avaikzble at http://www.iopcfund.org/
npdf/genE.pdf. Information on the number of ratifications necessary for entry into force was
compiled from the treaty texts.
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Treaty

IAEA Convention
on
Supplementary
Compensation
for Nuclear
Damage
Convention on
Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution
Damage
Resulting From
the Exploration
for and
Exploitation of
Seabed Mineral
Resources
UNECE
Convention on
Civil Liability
for Damage
Caused During
Carriage of
Dangerous
Goods by Road,
Rail and Inland
Navigation
Vessels
IMO International
Convention on
Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution
Damage
(replaced 1969
Convention)

Year of
Adoption

855

Number of
Signatures

Number of
Ratifications

Ratifications
Necessary for
Entry Into
Force

Entry
Into
Force

Not
in
Force

1997

13

3

5 states with
a minimum
of 400,000
units of
installed
nuclear
ca aci

1977

6

0

4

Not
in
Force

1989

2

5

Not
in
Force

10

10 states,
including4
states with
more than
one million
units of gross
tonnage

1996

1992

122
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Treaty

Year of
Adoption

Number of
Signatures

Number of
Ratifications

Ratifications
Necessary for
Entry Into
Force

Entry
Into
Force

International
Convention
on the
Establishment of
an International
Fund for Oil
Pollution
Damage
(replaced 1971
Convention)

1992

10

104

8

1996

• Protocol

2003

3

21

8

2005

0

3 states,
including at
least 2
Council of
Europe states

Not
in
Force

Not
in
Force

Not
in
Force

Council of Europe
Lugano
Convention on
Civil Liabiliry
for Damage
Resulting From
Activities
Dangerous
to the
Environment
IMO Convention
on Liability &
Compensation
in Connection
with Carriage
of Hazardous
and Noxious
Substances
by Sea
Basel Protocol on
Liabiliry and
Compensation
for Damage
Resulting From
T ransboundary
Movements
of Hazardous
Wastes

1993

9

1996

8

8

12 states,
including 4
states that
have at least
two million
units of gross
tonnage

1999

13

8

20

857

Beyond the Liability Wall

Treaty

Year of
Adoption

Number of
Signatures

IMO International
Convention on
Civil Liability
for Bunker Oil
Pollution
Damage

2001

3

UNECE Protocol
on Civil
Liability and
Compensation
for Damage
Caused by the
T ransboundary
Effects of
Industrial
Accidents on
T ransboundary
Waters

2003

24

Number of
Ratifications

Ratifications
Necessary for
Entry Into
Force

Entry
Into
Force

18

18 states,
including 5
states with
gross tonnage
not less than
one million
units

2008

16

Not
in
Force

As is clear from Table 1, the enormous diplomatic energy expended in
various international fora over close to four decades has resulted in only
a handful of operational agreements. "Getting to yes" (completing negotiations on a treaty text), has only rarely led to "getting it done" (bringing
the treaty to life through entry into force and implementation through
57
domestic legislation). As Alan Boyle of the University of Edinburgh
put it, understatedly, "[l]ack of participation is a problem with most of
the liability schemes; at best it casts some doubt on their acceptability
58
or relevance."
Table 1 illustrates just a portion of the overall problem with civil
liability treaties. It does not capture the instances where a civil liability
treaty is in force, but the most important states-the ones hosting the
targeted activities-have not ratified it. For example, major nuclear states
such as the United States, Canada, South Korea, and Japan have all refused

57.
Bertram I. Spector, Deconstntcting the Negotiations of Regime Dynamics, in GmiNG IT
DoNE, supra note 11, at 51, 55. See generally ROGER FISHER ET AL., GITfiNG TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN ( 1991 ).
58.
Boyle, supra note 50, at 16.
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to ratify the nuclear liability conventions.
No industrialized states have
ratified the major civil liability treaties governing shipments of hazardous
waste and cargo-the Basel Liability Protocol and the Hazardous and
Noxious Substances (HNS) Convention.
Table 1 also does not capture situations where negotiations on tort
liability rules began but never came to fruition, or where liability negotiations never even commenced even though such negotiations were explicitly
called for in another international convention. There are over a dozen
examples of treaties that call for future liability negotiations that were
60
never followed by achievement of a liability agreement.
In the existing literature on civil liability in international environmental law, scholars have rarely mentioned the poor ratification record of
civil liability treaties and have not paid sufficient attention to the implica61
tions of this poor record for future attempts at treaty negotiation. Indeed,
59.
See lnt'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA), Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage, (Apr. 20, 2007), available at www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/
liability_status.pdf.
60.
See, e.g., Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of
the Wider Caribbean Region, art. XIV, Mar. 24, 1983, 1506 U.N.T.S. 157, available at
http://www.cep.unep.org/pubs/legislation/cartxt.html ("The Contracting Parties shall co-operate with
a view to adopting appropriate rules and procedures ... in the field of liability and compensation for
damage resulting from pollution of the Convention area."); Convention for the Protection of the
Natural Resources of the South Pacific Region, art. 20, Nov. 25, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 38 (stating that
parties to the convention shall cooperate in the adoption of rules and procedures concerning liability and compensation for damage resulting from pollution); Convention on the Protection of
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, art. 17, Mar. 22, 1974, 1507 U.N.T.S. 167 ("The
Contracting Parties undertake, as soon as possible, jointly to develop and accept rules concerning responsibility for damage resulting from acts or omissions in contravention of the present
Convention, including, inter alia, limits of responsibility, criteria and procedures for the
determination of liability and available remedies."); United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, art. 235(3), Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. NCONF.62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982) ("States shall
cooperate in the implementation of existing international law and the further development of intemationallaw relating to responsibility and liability [and) criteria and procedures for payment of adequate
compensation .... "). See also LEFEBER, supra note 1, at 4 n.8 (gathering treaties and declarations
that call for further discussions on liability and redress).
See, e.g., Robert Cleton, The CRTD Convention on Civil Liability and Compensation, in
61.
TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 205, 218 (Ralph P. Kroner ed.,
1993) (describing the provisions of the treaty in detail and noting that "it is not very likely that the
Convention will enter into force within the foreseeable future"); KUMMER, supra note 2, at 239
(summarizing the main features of civil liability treaties, outlining their strengths and weaknesses,
and explaining that few of the treaties have ever entered into force); Blay & Green, supra note 9, at
25, 36 (outlining liability issues related to environmental damage in Antarctica, noting in passing
that a "speedy conclusion of a liability regime [is) rather unlikely"); Michael Tsimplis, Liability and

Compensation in the International Transport of Hazardous Wastes by Sea: The 1999 Protocol
to the Basel Convention, 16 [NT'L j. MARINE & COASTAL L. 295, 334 (2001) (calling the lack of
entry into force of the Basel Liability Protocol "sobering," after a forty page discussion of its contents and requirements).
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the Basel Liability Protocol has often been described as a model for the
future, even though it has not entered into force nine years after its ini. 1 a doptton.
. 62
tta
Given the record to date, it is time to shift gears and move away
from the detailed discussions about how to structure civil liability treaties, and instead examine what has precluded mutual cooperation on civil
liability treaties in the past and what the alternatives are for the future.
Continuation of the prior patterns of negotiations will not be fruitful, and
may very well be counterproductive. As Anne Daniel, a Canadian environmental negotiator, has written, "a continuing series of sectoral liability
treaties could simply result in implementation overload that could challenge
63
even the most robust national legal systems."

II.

TORT'S TUMULT: ANALYZING THE CAUSES OF FAILURE

Dissecting the reasons for past failures in the civil liability field requires
delving into the dynamics of how and why nations cooperate (or refuse to
cooperate) in international affairs. In this Part, I develop a model at the
intersection of international law and international relations theory that
illustrates how states negotiate over liability rules for transboundary
environmental damage. The model helps to explain past conflicts, especially
those between developed states and developing states, and shows how
liability negotiations differ from other types of environmental negotiations.
This Part presents the model and three conclusions about the underlying causes of the problematic history of civil liability in international
environmental law.
My model is grounded in regime theory-the study of the formation,
dissolution, and consequences of international regimes. Numerous definitions of a regime have been provided in the literature. The most
commonly cited definition is Stephen Krasner's: A regime is a set of
"implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area

62.
At the time of negotiations, the Basel Liability Protocol was widely seen as "breaking new
ground" on the international law of compensation and liability. Paola Bettelli et al., Summary of the
Fifth Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal: 6-10 December 1999, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., Dec. 13,
1999, at 1, 13, available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb2006e.pdf. See also Brunnee, supra
note 1, at 361 ("[T]he protocol has begun to serve as a model for other agreements.").
63.
Daniel, supra note 10, at 236.

55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 837 (2008)

860
64

of international relations." Krasner's definition could capture informal
arrangements and understandings as regimes, such as the cooperation among
allies over time. However, in the highly legalistic civil liability field, it
makes sense to view the point at which a treaty enters into force, thereby
imposing binding legal obligations, as the objective measure of when a regime
65
has formed. To reflect that civil liability is based on the complex coordination of legal institutions through treaties, I adopt the definition of the
international relations scholar Radoslav Dimitrov: A regime is a "formal
intergovernmental policy agreement that involves specific commitments
to policy targets ... and has entered into force according to the terms of
,66
t h e lega l text.
Regime theory was developed in the late 1970s and 1980s by political
scientists such as Krasner, Robert Keohane, Robert Axelrod, Duncan Snidal,
Kenneth Oye, and Oran Young. That period saw the proliferation of
international institutions in the fields of security, trade, environment, and
development. Regime theorists sought to explain the basis and function of
that multilateral cooperation, even as the dominant political dynamic
67
remained the bipolar conflict of the Cold War.
With this intellectual
orientation, most regime theory literature has focused on successful examples
of institution building. Here, I use the tools of regime theory to explain
nonregimes, or situations where states have consistently tried, but failed, to
68
build cooperative institutions. Nonregimes, which are as much a result of
collective political decisions as successful regimes, are important to study
in order to understand the conditions under which countries will cooperate
.
.
l goa ls. 69
to ac h 1eve
env1ronmenta
Most regime theorists are rationalists-they assume that states are selfinterested unitary actors seeking to secure their interests in an anarchic

64.
Haggard & Simmons, supra note 11, at 493; see also id. at 493-96 (reviewing definitions of "regime").
65.
See Bertram I. Spector & Anna R. Korula, Problems of Ratifying International
Environmental Agreements: Overcoming Initial Obswcles in the Post-Agreement Negotiation Process, 3
GLOBAL ENvrL. CHANGE 369, 372 (1993) (explaining that while countries sometimes comply with
treaty language without formal ratification, ratification is the more usual practice and provides a
verifiable measure of states' support for a treaty).
66.
See OIMITROV, supra note 13, at 5.
67.
See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2624-26 (1997) (book review).
68.
See DIMITROV, supra note 13, at 9; see also Radoslav S. Oimitrov et a!., International
Nonregimes: A Research Agenda, 9 lNT'L STUDIES REV. 230 (2007).
69.
Cf. Dimitrov eta!., supra note 68, at 232.
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70

international system.
Regime theory is rooted in neoliberalism, and its
adherents believe that states act to maximize their absolute gains, rather
than their relative gains in relation to other states. Regime theorists
argue that cooperation is possible and common in the international system and that international institutions (formal or informal) can shape and
modify state behavior over extended periods of time, even when powerful
71
states object to the institution.
A basic tenet of regime theory is that "interests determine regimes.'.n
In other words, states seek to form regimes where cooperative arrangements will serve their overlapping interests in a way that states could not
achieve acting alone. Think of the role of NATO, for example, in serving
the combined interests of the United States, Canada, and Western
European nations in countering the Soviet threat. Even where interests
converge, however, regime formation is not inevitable because cooperation can be derailed through strategic behavior, miscommunication, or
incentives to defect or free-ride. 73

A.

Two Models of Environmental Liability Negotiations

With this focus on underlying interests in mind, I develop a model of
how negotiations occur over new liability rules in two subparts. I first sketch
a "Basic Model" of how two states negotiate over ongoing cross-border
pollution emissions. This kind of bilateral model has dominated both
political science scholarship and legal scholarship on the dynamics of
transboundary pollution to date. I then make important modifications to
the Basic Model to develop an "Extended Model" that captures the
peculiarities and nuances of pollution liability negotiations, which carry

70.
See GEHRING, supra note 40, at 23-24; Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for International
Regimes, 36 INT'L ORO. 325, 335 (1982) (assuming that states are rational utility maximizers "in that
they display consistent tendencies to adjust to external changes in ways that are calculated to
increase the expected value of outcomes to them").
71.
See Oran R. Young, The Politics of International Regime Fannation: Managing Natural
Resources and the Environment, 43 INT'LORG. 349,350 (1989); Zartman, supra note 11, at 20.
72.
ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 48 (1990); see also Zartman, supra note 11, at 31.
73.
See Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, in
COOPERA':'ION UNDER ANARCHY 1, 7-8 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986) {laying out the incentives
of the two prisoners in the classic prisoners' dilemma game and showing how the rational decisions of
each can produce a sub-optimal outcome for both); see also ORAN B. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 226
(Cornell Stud. in Pol. Econ., 1989) ("Despite the existence of a distinct zone of agreement, the
parties may well fail to reach agreement ... as a result of strategic misrepresentations .... ").
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more uncertainties, involve more parties, and address risks that may not
occur until years after the negotiations.
1.

The Basic Model

In the Basic Model, State A is emitting damaging levels of pollution across its border into State B, and State B demands a formal
intergovernmental meeting to negotiate an agreement on halting the
pollution. State B can point to abundant law to mount its case. The
Stockholm Declaration, the Rio Declaration, and numerous other soft-law
instruments prescribe that no state may use its territory to cause environmental damage in the territory of another state. 74 The most famous
of all international environmental law cases, the Trail Smelter arbitral deci5
sion of 1941/ would likely support State B's claims of legal injury. 76
Despite all the legal instruments supporting State B, regime theory
would model this negotiation as "deadlock," where one actor always prefers mutual defection (noncooperation) to mutual cooperation, 77 and the
transboundary pollution would likely continue. No pollution control treaty
is likely to be concluded in this setting because State A, the source state,
gains from externalizing pollution to State B, the affected state. With
directly opposed interests, State A will always face a negative payoff from
forming a control regime. The Basic Model demonstrates that transboundary pollution often results in a kind of "victim pays" dynamic in which

74.
See U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, supra note 15, princ. 21; U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development, supra note 16, princ. 2.
75.
(U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. lnt'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
76.
The Trail Smelter decision was the first to clearly enunciate the principle that no state
may use its territory in such a manner as to cause environmental injury in another state. See id. The
tribunal found Canada in violation of international law because of damage in the United States
caused by Canadian sulfur emissions. See id. Whether this principle today constitutes customary
international law is a matter of considerable debate. See, e.g., Karin Mickelson, Rereading
Trail Smelter, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL
SMELTER ARBITRATION, supra note 28, at 79 (arguing that the unusual circumstances of the Trail Smelter
arbitration limit its precedential value); Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary
Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 951-54 (1997) (discussing the relationship between Trail Smelter
and subsequent development of the soft law of transboundary pollution); David A. Wirth,
Teaching and Research in International Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 423, 436
( 1999) (noting the lack of state practice to refrain from transboundary pollution out of a sense
of legal obligation).
77.
As Kenneth Oye has noted, in a game of deadlock "conflictual outcomes follow ... directly
and simply from the payoff structure." Oye, supra note 73, at 7. No amount of policy coordination
or trust-building activities can alter the basic underlying divergence of incentives. Id. at 6-7.
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the source state has no incentive to cooperate on abating the pollution
78
absent some compensation from the victim.
International law scholars often couch their analysis of transboundary
pollution problems in terms of the Basic Model. For example, Thomas
Merrill of Columbia Law School modeled a bilateral, state-to-state conflict
in one of the most significant American law review articles on the dynam79
ics of transboundary pollution. According to Merrill, transboundary
pollution is a public-law, state-centered conflict, in which a plaintiff state
and a defendant state are the relevant parties. He suggests principles to
guide the states in presenting their contesting claims in negotiations or before
80
a tribunal, "much like an appellate argument."
The Basic Model is insufficient, however, to explain the nuances of civil
liability negotiations. It assumes that a state, as an entity, is the party that is
causing the pollution, and that another state is suffering the effects of the
pollution. It thereby obscures the true nature of transboundary pollution
dynamics, where industrial firms or transporters are usually the sources of
pollution and private parties are the victims. National governments provide the political setting for such conflicts, but the long-standing interest
in civil liability rules demonstrates that states are looking to private dispute
resolution among directly affected parties as a solution to the conflict.
2.

The Extended Model

The Basic Model needs to be extended to capture how states might
negotiate over a treaty establishing private liability rules for transboundary
pollution, as opposed to a treaty aimed at reducing emission levels. To show
how the presence of liability walls, introduced in Part I, affects state
incentives to ratify a civil liability treaty, I develop in this subpart an
Extended Model that has two major components:
78.
See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal
Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 751-52 (1999) (arguing that the polluter pays principle cannot be
implemented in an international system of voluntary assent to treaties because "polluters will simply
decline to participate in a regime that imposes net costs on them").
79.
See Merrill, supra note 76.
80.
Id. at 1008--09. Merrill recommends that trans boundary pollution should be handled on a
case-by-case basis, after environmental damage occurs, through application of two "golden rules" of
reciprocity whose content will vary depending on the states involved. The golden rule is "do unto
other states as you do to your own citizens," and the reverse golden rule is "do not ask of other states
what you do not ask of your own citizens." Id. at 998. Before an international tribunal or in bilateral
negotiations, a state could propose a decision rule (related to the standard of liability, limits on
damages, or procedural protections) that is no more favorable than the way that state treats its own
citizens or industries in a similar context. Id. at 1007-08.
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First, the Extended Model identifies domestic constituents as the true
party-in-interest in the negotiations and shows how states act to promote the
interests of their domestic firms and/or citizens. For example, states with a
large number of firms capable of causing transboundary environmental
damage would be the most resistant to agree to civil liability treaties that
could lower liability walls and expose those firms to suit.
Second, the Extended Model multilateralizes the Basic Model by
introducing multiple parties and multidirectional pollution flows. The
multilateral Extended Model suggests that there are heightened transaction
costs to regime formation due to the large number of parties at the bargaining table, and it also suggests that states can be both source states and affected
states, depending on the type of environmental damage being targeted by a
liability treaty.
I will discuss each of these components of the Extended Model in tum.
First, any model of liability negotiations must capture the role of domestic
constituents because civil liability negotiations involve states negotiating
over the interests of their domestic firms and/or citizens (for example, the
interests of XYZ Corporation that owns the emitting factory in State A
or the interests of the residents of Big City in State B that are affected by the
pollution). Although tort itself is retrospective and compensatory, a negotiation over harmonizing tort rules for environmental damage can be viewed
as a battle between states over which prospective legal rules, decision
procedures, liability limits, and insurance obligations will most benefit
their domestic constituents. The Basic Model misses this nuance by positing that states themselves are both the source of harm and the relevant
injured party.
81
Regime theorists rarely delve into the black box of domestic politics,
but it is essential to do so in order to understand the causes of past failures
of regime formation. A negotiation over a new liability treaty is a two-level
game in which governments aim to "win" on both the international plane
(vis-a-vis other states) and on the domestic plane (by negotiating
82
arrangements that benefit powerful domestic interests). Actions that
are rational on the international plane (including, perhaps, agreeing with
a close ally on civil liability rules) may be impossible for decisionmakers to
take because of domestic constraints. A "win-set" is the set of treaty

See Haggard & Simmons, supra note 11, at 513.
See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,
42 INT'LORG. 427,434 (1988).
81.
82.
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provtstons or policies achievable on the international plane that are also
83
acceptable and ratifiable at the domestic level.
How do states serve their domestic constituents in a negotiation over
liability rules? The primary interest of a rational source state is minimizing
the risk that domestic firms will get sued for damages related to their
externalized pollution. Liability walls are therefore crucial to understanding state incentives vis-a-vis civil liability treaties. States hosting
polluting firms that externalize pollution across borders are likely to be
opposed to new liability rules for environmental damage and are likely to
be strongly wedded to the legal status quo, with its numerous procedural
hurdles to transnational tort litigation for environmental damage. Longstanding rules of private international law governing jurisdiction, choice
of law, and enforcement of judgments create a defensive bulwark that
benefits risk-externalizing domestic firms in a source state. A rational
affected state-that is, a state on the receiving end of transboundary
pollution flows-has the opposite incentive: to support a civil liability
treaty as a means to lower liability walls and to ensure that its citizens have
improved avenues for redress and compensation in the event of substantial environmental damage. The Extended Model therefore predicts a high
degree of conflict among states over liability treaties, depending on the
interests of their domestic constituents in relation to liability walls.
The second component of the Extended Model recognizes that liability negotiations are usually multilateral and involve pollution flows or
pollution risks that are multidirectional. The countries involved in these
negotiations are rarely solely source states or solely affected states, as in
the Basic Model, but rather can be identified as both, depending on the
types of activities or pollution involved. Most countries contribute to
trans boundary environmental damage (even to a small extent or in a diffuse
manner) and are affected by transboundary pollution from other states.
I use a two-by-two grid, shown in Table 2, to capture the multidimensional aspects of liability negotiations.84 Here, a state's negotiating
position on a civil liability treaty is a function of two factors: ( 1) the
domestic economic prevalence of the activity targeted by the civil liability treaty (because of the state's interest in protecting firms from
transnational tort suits), and (2) the state's ecological exposure to harm
83.
Id. at 435-36.
84.
This two-by-two grid is based on a model developed by Detlef Sprinz and Tapani
Vaahtoranta, which they applied to European negotiations over transport of pollutants that cause
acid rain, as well as to global negotiations over control of ozone-depleting substances. See Sprinz &
Vaahtoranta, supra note 12.
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from foreign firms engaging in the targeted acttvtty (because of the
state's interest in ensuring that its citizens can sue foreign firms causing
transboundary environmental damage).
TABLE 2: STATE POSITIONS IN RELATION TO A HYPOTHETICAL CIVIL
LIABILITY ThEATY
Domestic Economic Prevalence
of the Targeted Activity

Low
Ecological Exposure
to the Targeted
Activity

Low

!-Bystanders

High

Ill-Supporters

High
II -Strong
Opponents
IV-Likely
Opponents

Category I states are the bystanders-states that do not suffer any
major harm from the type of transboundary pollution targeted by a civil
liability treaty and that do not have major economic dependence on indus~
tries that pose transboundary environmental risks. With little to win or
lose from a treaty, they are likely to abstain from negotiations on civil
liability treaties or offer only lukewarm support. Category II states are likely
to be strong opponents because, in lowering liability walls, a civil liability
treaty may threaten important domestic industries. Category III states, in
contrast, are likely to be supporters of a civil liability treaty. They are
frequently exposed to ecological risks from cross~border pollution, yet they
do not have a high degree of economic dependence on activities that create
cross-border environmental damage. As in the Basic Model, the Extended
Model still predicts intense conflict between category II states and category
III states over the terms of any civil liability treaty.
What about category IV states? They have a high degree of economic
involvement in activities that might be targeted by a civil liability treaty as
well as a high degree of ecological exposure to cross~border environmental
damage. Category IV states are labeled likely opponents because of the
probable dynamics of public choice within their national capitals. Industry
opponents of a civil liability treaty would argue vociferously against adop~
tion of a treaty, and industry lobbies probably have a larger influence on state
negotiating postures compared to the political influence of diffuse groups of
individuals who may be exposed to transboundary pollution. Individuals
usually do not know, ex ante, whether they will be victims of trans boundary
environmental damage, and therefore, in both developed and developing
states, they have little incentive to lobby in support of a treaty.
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Table 2 illuminates negotiating dynamics in a variety of civil liability
contexts. Instead of assuming that states are either source states or affected
states related merely through bilateral flows of pollution, Table 2 shows
how state interests regarding a potential civil liability treaty are shaped as a
function of competing factors of geography, ecological exposure, and the
intensity of economic activity. It also highlights the prominence of domestic considerations in structuring negotiating postures.
B.

Using the Extended Model to Identify the Causes of Regime Failure

The more nuanced perspective of the Extended Model helps to illuminate three persistent causes of regime failure in the civil liability field:
( 1) interest conflicts between developed states and developing states; ( 2) high
transaction costs to adopt and implement treaties, combined with low
expected payoffs; and (3) incorporation of treaty provisions that are too onerous for states to accept.
1.

Interest Conflicts Between Developed States and Developing States

The Extended Model is similar to the Basic Model in one crucial
respect: it still predicts underlying patterns of conflict in negotiations over
new civil liability treaties (especially between the category II states and
category III states in Table 2). Given these conflicting interests in relation
to liability walls, the basic prediction of deadlock in the Basic Model also
holds in the Extended Model. There will be no "demand for regimes',ss unless
some incentive can be provided to induce the participation of states that
view themselves as net losers in a more harmonized system of tort liability rules for environmental damage. 86
There are undoubtedly many developing nations that fall into category II for particular treaties. For example, they may be net exporters of
pollution to other states, with a high degree of dependence on the industries
causing the pollution. But the most prominent cleavage in past negotiations has been a split between developed states and developing states.
Since the 1972 Stockholm conference, developed countries have been
the most consistent and vocal opponents of civil liability regimes. Because
the goal in establishing a civil liability regime is to "remove obstacles to
85.
See Keohane, supra note 70, at 337.
86.
Oran Young has argued that regime formation is unlikely under these circumstances
because of the absence of a clear "contractarian environment" in which all parties can see joint gains
from devising new institutional arrangements. See Young, supra note 71, at 367.
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transboundary litigation and in certain cases to ensure that liability stan~
dards are harmonized and an effective remedy guaranteed," it is not sur~
prising that industrialized states have refused, in large numbers, to sign
87
and ratify the treaties.
Developed states are likely to be concentrated in
category II, with strong interests in maintaining liability walls due to their
concentration of large firms capable of causing environmental damage
across borders.
Developing states, in contrast, have been the primary advocates of
88
negotiating new civil liability treaties.
Developing states have favored
harmonized liability rules and the imposition of strict liability as means to
lower liability walls and thereby enhance avenues for compensation and
89
redress against foreign firms.
Developing states are likely to be concen~
trated in categories I and Ill in Table 2. Because tort law provides a means
to shift the costs of harms back onto the culpable party, internationally
agreed~upon liability rules, from the perspective of developing states, are
an attractive means of correcting global power imbalances, redressing
historical inequities, and assisting their citizens. Indeed, developing state
negotiating positions on civil liability treaties have been closely inter~
twined with larger grievances, such as the lack of accountability of
multinational corporations operating in poor countries and the wide
disparities in wealth that undergird international shipments of hazardous
90
wastes to the developing world.
The conflicts between developed and developing states with respect
to liability rules are therefore not just over interests (how domestic
constituents in each set of states will fare under various liability regimes),
87.
Sand, supra note 31, at 97.
See Brunnee, supra note 1, at 360 (discussing the Basel Liability Protocol and noting that
88.
because the underlying Basel Convention was designed to "ensure safe transfers of hazardous waste
from developed countries to recipient countries in the South, it is not surprising that many of the
negotiating issues pitted developed against developing countries.").
See id. at 362. According to Brunnee, in negotiations over liability rules for the
89.
Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, developed countries opposed an enabling clause that would lead to
subsequent discussions on liability for environmental damage from living modified organisms
(LMOs). See id. Developing countries, in contrast, "were concerned at their limited capacity
for risk assessment and risk management. They saw a liability regime as essential to their protection
against the risks of transboundary movements of living, genetically modified organisms." Id.
(footnote omitted).
90.
See Daniel, supra note 10, at 236 ("Developing countries have a strong interest in the
development of liability regimes as a method of protection against the activities of multinational
corporations. While some developed countries have been supportive of liabiliry regimes ... developing countries were the driving force .... ") (emphasis omitted); see also Gino J. Naldi, The
Regulation of the Transnational Trade in Hazardous Wastes-The African Response, 7 S. AFR.j.
ENvrL L. & POL'Y 213 (2000).
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but also over power (who will exercise control over the international
environmental agenda). The power disparities between developed and
developing nations help to explain why liability rules have so frequently
been pushed off negotiating agendas and relegated to subsequent protocols
that have slim chance of adoption.
The negotiations in 1998 and 1999 over a treaty regulating international shipments of genetically altered seeds and plant tissues, known as
living modified organisms (LMOs), are an example of how the conflicts
within the Extended Model play out in practice. Significant conflict
emerged between developed states that are major biotech exporters
(including the United States, Canada, and Australia) and over 120
developing states present at the negotiation. Developing states, under
the leadership of Worku Damena of Ethiopia, pushed to get tort liability rules includt:d in the initial text of a treaty on LMOs because they were
concerned about ecological damage in developing countries, where LMOs
were being heavily marketed by biotech companies based in the developed
91
world. The United States and a handful of other biotechnology exporters
opposed including any tort liability provisions in the treaty text. Faced
with this opposition, and not wanting to derail the entire treaty, the
developing nations were forced to postpone the liability discussions to a
92
later date. According to delegate Damena:
The negotiations on liability and redress were particularly chilly, as
there was a stunned silence from the delegates of the industrialized
countries every time the issue was raised. It was perhaps the only issue
in which the industrialized countries invariably showed their lack of
interest and successfully stalled the talks, repeating that the issue is a
complex one . . . . I found it difficult to understand why some of these
states opposed rules on liability and redress when they already had
tough laws at the domestic level. The developed countries' sincerity
about providing an adequate safety regime for a new technology to

91.
Ecological concerns related to LMOs include gene contamination of native crops,
resistance of target pests, increased use of chemical pesticides, and toxicity of LMOs for animals. See
Helmut Gaugitsch, Scientific Aspects of the Biosafety Debate, in THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON
BIOSAFETY: RECONCILING TRADE IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WITH ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
83 (Christoph Bail et al. eds., 2002).
92.
See Worku Damena, Liability and Redress, in THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON
BIOSAFETY: RECONCILING TRADE IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WITH ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 91, at 369 ("[By the end of 1998], I had come to accept that it would be difficult to
forestall the inclusion in the protocol of an enabling clause in preference to a substantive one
because of the industrialized countries' overwhelming opposition to my position.").
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which they are subjecting the developing world was suggested by their
93
bleak position on liability and redress.

Similar negotiating dynamics were noted by Kate Cook, a delegate to
the negotiations who was then legal advisor to the U.K.'s Department of
Environment, Transport, and the Regions. According to Cook, developing
countries consistently expounded "the message that if this subject [liability
for LMO releases] were to be left out, the prospects for successfully finaliz~
94
ing a protocol would be minimal." In contrast, she observed, developed
country opposition to liability rules stemmed from their concern that "sig~
nificant resources would be diverted into a complex and time~consuming
95
exercise for which there was not, as yet, any demonstrable need[.]"
According to Cook, the source of the split between developed and
developing nations was differing "perception[s] of how well their own
countries would be able to cope with the consequences of any incident that
might occur in the future. Thus developing countries generally supported
96
the inclusion of liability, while most developed countries were opposed .... "
Developed states have not uniformly opposed all civil liability treaties,
however. Developed states have for the most part adhered to and imple~
men ted the regimes governing oil spill liability and nuclear liability. One
factor that led to the relative success of the oil spill liability regime was that
oil shipments have long been conducted under rules set by international
conventions. The International Maritime Organization oversees a series of
treaties governing accident prevention, design of tankers, and emergency
response procedures. Addressing liability for environmental damage from
oil spills through an international convention therefore was not viewed as
a radical departure from existing precedent. Moreover, the formation of an
oil pollution liability regime was greatly facilitated by the prior existence
of well~developed insurance markets for oil shipments and a relative pre~
dictability in the amount and frequency of damages, due to decades of
experience with oil shipping. Prior to the adoption of the 1969 oil
spill liability convention, the oil shipping industry had already agreed,
97
through contract, to similar liability provisions. In the case of the nuclear

93.
94.

ld. at 368.

96.
97.

ld.

Kate Cook, Liability: 'No Liability, No Protocol', in THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON
BIOSAFETY, RECONCILING TRADE IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WITH ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 92, at 371,372.
95.
Id. at 373.

See Tank Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution
(TOVALOP), Jan. 7, 1969, 8I.L.M. 498 (1969).
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liability regime, governments in developed nations were eager to adopt a
treaty that assigned liability solely to nuclear plant operators so as to
preclude suits against governments themselves, which were the primary
98
suppliers of nuclear raw materials.
Developed states also likely supported the oil spill and nuclear accident liability regimes to promote the underlying activities of oil shipments
and nuclear power generation. Civil liability treaties that lower barriers
to transboundary tort suits can, in addition to helping potential victims,
serve to encourage and facilitate the targeted activity. This can occur by
providing financial certainty to private operators through damage caps
(limiting the liability exposure of tanker owners and nuclear plant operators), and it can also occur by overcoming political opposition to new
technologies by creating legal remedies in the case of accidents.
This encouragement function provides some incentive for host
states-those with economic reliance on the underlying activity-to ratify
a civil liability treaty. As Alan Boyle has said, international harmonization of liability law establishes "a more equitable balance between the
interests of plaintiffs and defendants," helping to create "shared expectations
on a regional or global basis which may make the risks posed by hazardous
99
activities more socially acceptable to those likely to be affected."
The nature of the risks in the oil spill and nuclear liability contexts
also likely contributed to support from developed states. In both cases, the
damages from accidents can affect several countries, and there is no easy
calculus to be made in advance of a treaty regarding who will be a source
state and who will be an affected state. Shipments of oil are widespread
across oceans and within river systems, and many countries are exposed to
some risk of damage from spills. In the nuclear context, radiation plumes
can travel thousands of miles, as evidenced by the Chernobyl accident, so
even host states of nuclear reactors face a strong possibility of major
ecological damage from foreign nuclear reactors. As Oran Young has noted,
if a state "cannot know in advance whether [it] will occupy the role of site
of an accident, victim state, or unharmed bystander with respect to specific

98.
See Giinther D:Jeker & Thomas Gehring, Private ar International liability far Transnational
Environmental Damage-The Precedent of Conventional Liability Regimes, 2 J. ENVTL. L. 1, 10
(1990) (arguing that the primary goal of the Vienna Convention was not compensation of victims,
but rather was "regulat[ing) the international law of liability for transnational nuclear damage
according to the need for unhampered technological development").
99.
Boyle, supra note 50, at 12.
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accidents," then there is a strong incentive to "consider the common good
100
in devising institutional arrangements. "
Outside these two contexts, however, the ratification record of civil
liability treaties shows a sharp divergence between developed and developing states, as predicted by the Extended Model and Table 2. The pattern
that has emerged is that small numbers of developing countries have signed
and ratified civil liability treaties, but in insufficient numbers to bring the
treaties into force. In many cases, developing states that have little domestic dependence on the economic activity being regulated (category I or III
states) are the only states willing to ratify the treaties and become formal
parties. In contrast, developed states, defined here as the members of the
01
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/
have on occasion signed civil liability treaties, but they generally have not
become formal parties through ratification or accession. Table 3 shows this
recurring pattern in some of the civil liability treaties adopted since 1989.
TABLE 3: SIGNATORIES AND PARTIES TO SELECTED
CiVIL LiABILITY TREATIES ADOPTED SINCE 1989
Treaty Name
UNECE Convention on Civil
Liability for Damage Caused
During Carriage of
Dangerous Goods by
Road, Rail and Inland
102
Navigation Vessels (1989)

Signatory States

Ratifying or Acceding
States

OECD: Germany

OECD:None

Non-OECD: Morocco

Non-OECD: Liberia

100.
Young, supra note 71, at 367.
101.
The Members of the OECD are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United
States. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Ratification of the Convention on the OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1 ,OO.html (last visited
Feb. 19, 2008).
Supra note 44; see CRID Convention, Participants, http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/
102.
publi/crtd/status.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
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Treaty Name
Convention on Liabiliry
and Compensation
in Connection with
Carriage of Hazardous
and Noxious Substances
by Sea (1996) 103

Basel Protocol on Liabiliry
and Compensation
for Damage Resulting
from T ransboundary
Movements of Hazardous
Wastes (1999) 104
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Signatory States

Ratifying or Acceding
States

OECD: Canada, Denmark,
Finland, Germany,
Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, United Kingdom

OECD: None

Non-OECD: None

Non-OECD: Angola,
Cyprus, Morocco,
Russian Federation,
Saint Kitts and
Nevis, Samoa,
Slovenia, Tonga
OECD: None

OECD: Denmark, Finland,
France, Hungary,
Luxembourg, Sweden,
Switzerland, United
Kingdom
Non-OECD: Chile,
Columbia, Costa Rica,
Macedonia, Monaco

Non-OECD:
Botswana,
Democratic Republic
of the Congo,
Ethiopia, Ghana,
Liberia, Republic
of Congo, Syria, T ago

103.
Supra note 44; see Status of the HNS Convention, http://www.hnsconvention.org/
en/status.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
104.
Supra note 43; see Basel Convention, Parties to the Basel Liability Protocol,
http://www.basel.int/ratif/protocol.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
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Treaty Name
International Convention
on Civil Liability
for Bunker Oil
Pollution Damage
105
(2001 )

Protocol on Civil Liability
and Compensation
for Damage Caused
by the T ransboundary Effects
of Industrial Accidents
on Transboundary Waters
(2003)

Signatory States

Ratifying or Acceding
States

OECD: Canada, Australia,
Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Italy, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, United
Kingdom

OECD: Germany,
Greece, Spain,
Luxembourg, Poland,
United Kingdom

Non-OECD: Brazil

Non-OECD: Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus,
Estonia, Jamaica,
Latvia, Lithuania,
Samoa, Singapore,
Sierra Leone,
Slovenia, Tonga
OECD: Hungary

OECD: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland,
Greece, Luxembourg,
Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Sweden, United Kingdom
Non-OECD: Armenia,
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Estonia, Georgia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Monaco,
Moldova, Romania,
Ukraine

Non-OECD: None

The Extended Model suggests that developed states would normally
oppose such treaties to protect domestic firms. Why, then, would many
developed states sign but not ratify these agreements, rather than just oppose
them outright?
The pattern of OECD states signing, but not ratifying, these conventions is quite striking. It has not been previously noted in literature
on civil liability treaties. There are two possible explanations for the
behavior of developed states. Either there was a post-signature breakdown
in support for civil liability treaties, or there was little support to begin with

105.
See TRANSPORT CAN., MARITIME LAW REFORM DISCUSSION PAPER 15 n.12 (May
2005), http://www.tc.gc.ca/poVen/report/tp14370/tp14370e.pdf (listing signatories and parties). See
also lnt'l Mar. Org., Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the
International Maritime Organization ar Its Secretary-General Performs Depository ar Other Functions, Dec.
31, 2005, http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D14 744/9193.pdf.
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and developed states signed these civil liability treaties for symbolic rea~
sons, with no intent to ratify and become formal parties.
Literature on "post~agreement negotiation" suggests that both explana~
tions are plausible. Post~agreement negotiation is the "dynamic and
cooperative processes, systems, procedures, and structures that are institu~
tionalized to sustain dialogue on issues that cannot, by their very nature,
106
be resolved by a single agreement."
The post~agreement negotiation
literature views an initial treaty text as just a starting point for a
decades~ long process of subsequent negotiations, in both the domestic and
international spheres, concerning treaty ratification, interpretation,
107
implementation, and revision.
Gaining domestic support for ratification
108
of the treaty is just one step in this process, and conflicts can arise at any
stage of the post~agreement negotiation that can lead to overt or covert
defections from prior cooperative relationships.
There are four principal reasons why a state may decline to ratify a treaty
after initially signing it: ( 1) treaty~specific factors, such as emerging domes~
tic opposition to the content of the treaty; (2) extraneous factors, such as
other issues that gain a higher legislative priority; (3) process elements, such
as public pressure or the degree of personal involvement by national leaders
in pushing for ratification; and (4) status elements, such as the nature of the
domestic political process, the level of economic development, and public
109
spending in the issue area.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to detail the mechanisms of the
post~signature breakdown in support for various liability treaties. But it seems
plausible that national leaders in developed states may have signed civil
liability treaties for purely symbolic value (for example, to pay off domes~
tic constituencies or to claim credit for action on an environmental issue),
with no intention of ever becoming a formal party to the treaty.
In other cases, a head of state or foreign minister in an OECD country
may have genuinely supported a civil liability treaty, but opposition may
have emerged over time in that state due to the complicated nature of
multilevel bargaining games identified by Robert Putnam and other regime
theorists. For example, after treaty signing, the approaching need to pass

106.
Spector, supra note 57, at 55 (emphasis omitted).
107.
See Zartman, supra note 11, at 25-26 ("The process of regime formation does not stop
with adoption of a founding agreement .... [t]he idea of an ultimate instrument governed thereafter
by pacta servanda sunt is a notion of a bygone era."); see also Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of
Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1829 (2003).
See Spector & Korula, supra note 65, at 372.
108.
109.
Id.
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implementing legislation may have ignited the opposition of domestic
legislators or industry lobby groups who were not involved in the ini0
tial treaty negotiating process.ll It is also possible that elections and
changes in political control may have led to reversals in a state's initial
support for a civil liability treaty. In the United States, for example, the
1
Bush Administration repudiated both the Kyoto Protocolll and the Rome
Statute creating the International Criminal Court after the Clinton
112
Administration had signed both conventions.
That some developed
states may have initially signed a civil liability treaty does not undermine the Extended Model's predictions. The significant point is that
in the end, large numbers of developed states have concluded that it is
not in their interests to ratify the treaties and become formal parties.
2.

High Transaction Costs and Low Expected Payoffs

Extending the bilateral Basic Model through introduction of the more
realistic setting of multilateral negotiations in the Extended Model helps to
illuminate a second major obstacle to regime formation in the civil liability
field. This obstacle is the high transaction costs of negotiating and implementing agreements, coupled with the relatively low expected benefits.
On the cost side, the Basic Model fails to capture the significant
transaction costs of negotiating multilateral liability treaties. In the bilateral
110.
Spector and Korula have argued that new players involved in the domestic ratification
process can outmaneuver government officials who initially supported and signed a treaty:
Negotiators representing their countries before an international forum may be sufficiently
flexible to reach an agreement. &.!t stakeholders back home (such as ministry bureaucrats,
political parties, business, unions, citizen lobbies, etc.) may be much more hard-nosed
and tough as internal domestic negotiators, responsible for approving and implementing the
product of international negotiation.
Id. at 372-73 (emphasis omitted).
111.
Vice President AI Gore signed the Kyoto Protocol on behalf of the United States in
November 1998, even though it was clear at the time that there was not a two-thirds Senate majority in favor of the treaty. See SCOTI BARRE1T, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFf: THE STRATEGY
OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 370 (2003). The outcome in the Senate was fairly certain
because of the passage of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which passed by a 95-0 vote. See S. Res. 98,
105th Cong. (1997) (stating the sense of the Senate that the United States should not be a signatory
to any climate treary that did not include binding targets and timetables for developing as well as
industrialized nations or that "would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States").
112.
The Clinton Administration signed the treaty establishing the International Criminal
Court in December 2000. See Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Rarify International
Criminal Court Treaty, AM. Soc'Y lNT'L L., May 2002, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2007). Id. President Clinton explained that the treaty had "significant
flaws," but that "[w]ith signature ... we will be in a position to influence the evolution of the
court." Id. The Bush Administration quickly signaled its opposition to the treaty, citing a number
of objections. See id.
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setting of the Basic Model, we have seen that the source state has little
incentive to curtail pollution that is damaging the affected state, absent some
form of compensation. This is certainly a roadblock to regime formation,
but it is theoretically surmountable. The bilateral setting of the Basic
113
Model raises the possibility of Coasian bargaining in which the affected
state could offer some form of payment to the source state to install
pollution controls on its emitting facilities.
In contrast, consider the Extended Model, where there are dozens of
states attempting to negotiate a civil liability treaty, with complicated
pollution flows among numerous states and states acting as both source
states and affected states, depending on the type of pollution involved or
the time period in which the treaty is negotiated. The prospects for
Coasian bargains in this setting are dramatically diminished.
As Kenneth Oye and other regime theorists have noted, increasing the
numbers of parties involved in negotiations tends to raise the cost of regime
formation by making it difficult to find a satisfactory zone of agreement
among states and by raising the chance that parties will defect from an
114
agreement once formed.
"[A]nalytic constructs closely tied to a two-party
view of the world ... cannot carry us far in coming to terms with the politics of international regime formation."ll 5
With respect to civil liability treaties, dozens of parties are usually at
the table to negotiate the terms and conditions of liability rules. Some of the
116
liability treaties negotiated to date have been designed to be global, while
others are regional treaties that nevertheless encompass twenty or more
. l parties.
. ll 7 Th'ts creates a "1arge numbers" problem wtt
. h respect to
potentia
8
the transaction costs of negotiating the treaties.ll

113.
See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960). Coase argued
that private parties involved in a pollution or nuisance dispute will bargain over abatement, and that
in the absence of transaction costs, they will reach the economically efficient result. Id. Similar
bargaining could occur among states if the transactions costs are low.
114.
See Oye, supra note 73, at 19.
115.
Young, supra note 71, at 360.
116.
Examples of global treaties include the Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43, negotiated
as a follow up to the global Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, and the HNS Convention, supra note 44, which was
negotiated under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization.
The CRTD Convention, supra note 44, for example, was negotiated under the auspices
117.
of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, which has fifty-six member countries located in
Europe and Central Asia. See U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Eur., Member Countries, http://www.unece.org}
oes/member_countries/member_countries.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
118.
See Merrill, supra note 76, at 984-85.

55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 837 (2008)

878

On the benefit side, multilateral liability treaties have a "small numbers"
119

problem that also serves as a barrier to regime formation.
Any one party
considering joining a liability regime has only a small risk of having its
citizens victimized by the specific forms of transboundary pollution covered
by that treaty. That party may reject the prospect of a lengthy negotiation
for a multilateral treaty if it perceives only marginal benefits for its own
citizens from joining a regime. As Thomas Merrill has noted:
[M)ost transboundary pollution problems are perceived as being relatively isolated and localized disputes. People tend to focus on this
particular transboundary air pollution problem or that particular
transboundary water pollution problem; the ones they focus
on, of course, are the ones that have an immediate impact on
them . . . . Only if people and nation-states come to view each
individual transboundary dispute as just an example of a more
generic phenomenon that affects nearly everyone (including
themselves) are we likely [to] see significant support for a general0
ized regime of regulation of transboundary pollution .... lZ

It is not only the number of parties in the Extended Model that hinders regime formation, but also the uncertainties inherent in the rules being
negotiated. Liability negotiations involve more uncertainty compared to
regimes controlling transboundary emissions of pollutants, as in the Basic
Model, because there are no easily verifiable technological fixes that can be
mandated in a liability treaty and because liability treaties concern new tort
rules that will apply to future polluting activity or accidents. In most cases
(such as nuclear accidents or ecological damage from release of LMOs), the
probability of the event that triggers liability, the magnitude of the resulting
damage, and the prospect of a monetary recovery for injured victims pursuant to a treaty are all highly uncertain.
121
In theory, if states operate under a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance," with
uncertainty about who will ultimately pay tort judgments and about the
frequency of suits and amounts of damages, the prospects for contractualist
regime formation could increase. States may soften negotiating positions,
for example, if they are not sure how their own firms will fare under a new
civil liability regime. According to Oran Young, such a veil lengthens the
"shadow of the future" and "has the effect of increasing interest in the
formation of arrangements that can be justified on the grounds that they

119.
120.
121.

See id.
Id.
]OHN RAWLS,

A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118--23 (1971).
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are fair in procedural terms."
Indeed, Young argues that states are often
uncertain about what their own preferences are, especially, in the beginning
stages of treaty negotiation. This makes achievement of rough equity, rather
than Pareto optimality or maximization of individual self-interest, the
123
.
paramount concern o f negottators.
It is more likely, however, that the uncertainty inherent in negotiating over prospective liability rules has the opposite effect of hardening
negotiating positions and complicating calculations of the benefits of joining a treaty. For an affected state concerned about its exposure to a
transboundary harm, the benefit of joining a civil liability treaty may not
be realized until transboundary damage occurs and a claim for compensation for injured citizens is adjudicated. Treaty-based tort rules are written
broadly, and the details of their implementation are left to national legal
124
Civil liability treaties are therefore subject to delayed defections,
systems.
in which evidence that a party is noncooperative might not emerge until
future events trigger liability and actual suits are brought. The inability
to monitor cooperation in the near term is likely a serious disincentive to
forming a regime in the first place. Under emissions control treaties, in
contrast, it is usually easier to verify in the near term whether a state is
actually implementing required control measures through installation of
new technology or changes in industry practices. So even if we assume that
a group of states has underlying common interests in a more harmonized tort
regime for transboundary environmental damage, states within the group
might still find cooperation to be risky because "[t]he actor following a
cooperative strategy is vulnerable to losses inflicted by defecting partners." 125
3.

Treaty Content as a Cause of Regime Failure

The third major reason for the persistent failure to establish viable ton
remedies in international environmental law is that the content of civil
liability treaties themselves has often been too onerous and objectionable
for large groups of states to adopt. The Extended Model highlights the
primacy of protecting domestic constituents, and it appears that many states,

122.
0RAN YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A
STATELESS SOCIETY 43 (1994).
123.
124.
125.

See id.
See, e.g., Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43, at art. 19.
Christer Jonsson, Cognitive Factors in Regime Dynamics, in REGIME THEORY AND

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 202, 205 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993).
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concerned about the domestic impact of the treaties, have decided in their
game-theoretical calculus that it is better not to play the game at all.
Below, I argue that the deep obligations of civil liability treaties, such
as requirements to change domestic liability law and the threat of enforceable monetary judgments, have been a barrier to forming tort liability
regimes, and I compare the depth of obligations of civil liability treaties to
other major treaties in international environmental law. Here, I leave the
theoretical predictions of the Extended Model to examine self-reporting
by states on their reasons for nonratification. Drawing on these self-reports,
I conclude that high liability limits, lack of available insurance, and conflicts
with domestic legal systems have been frequent barriers to regime formation
in the civil liability field.
a.

The Depth of Civil Liability Treaties

Conflicts between developed and developing states permeate most
26
areas of international environmental law/ so scholars of the role of tort in
international environmental law are confronted with a puzzling question:
Why has the international community been able to bridge these conflicts
in negotiating primary treaties, but not in negotiating associated liability
rules? As noted briefly in Part I, liability rules for environmental damage
have traditionally been negotiated as adjuncts to a broader primary treaty
that establishes nonliability obligations in the same field of law. The primary treaties establish governmental obligations to prevent environmental
damage, and the associated liability treaties establish the rights and remedies
of private actors if environmental damage nonetheless occurs. The primary
treaties have generally been far more successful in terms of attracting support. Table 4 shows this relationship for several recent civil liability treaties.

126.
See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International Environmental
taw, 76 TUL. L. REV. 843 (2002); Adil Najam, The View From the South: Developing Countries in
Global Environmenral Politics, in THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: INSTITUTIONS, LAW AND POLICY 225
(Regina S. Axelrod eta!. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
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TABLE 4: PRIMARY ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES AND ASSOCIATED LIABILITY RULES
Primary Treaty

Purpose

Parties

U.N. Convention on
the Law of the NonNavigational Uses
of International
Watercourses
127
(1997)

Requires parties to
protect, preserve,
and manage the
quality of
international
watercourses under
the principle of
"equitable and
reasonable
utilization."

14

Encourages parties to
provide assistance
in the event of an
industrial accident
with transboundary
effects, to cooperate
on research and
development,
and to share
information and
technology.
Establishes informed
consent procedures
for shipments
of wastes, provides
that wastes must
be managed in an
environmentally
sound manner,
and provides for
penalties in the
event of illegal
shi ments.

36

and

Convention on the
T ransboundary
Effects of Industrial
Accidents
(1992)128

Basel Convention
on the Control
ofTransboundary
Movements
of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal
(1989)129

168

Associated
Liability Treaty

Parties

Protocol on Civil
Liability and
Compensation
for Damage
Caused by the
T ransboundary
Effects of
Industrial
Accidents on
T ransboundary
Waters (2003)

Basel Protocol on
Liability and
Compensation
(1999)

8

12 7.
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
May 21, 1997, 36l.L.M. 700.
128.
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Mar. 17, 1992,
UN/E/ECE/1268, 31l.L.M. 1330 (1992).
129.
Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43.
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Primary Treaty
Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety
130
(2000)

Purpose

Parties

Establishes informed
consent procedures
among governments
for trans boundary
shipments of
Living Modified
Organisms.

139

Associated
Liability Treaty
Potential
liability
protocol or
amendment
(under
discussion
since 2000)

Parties
N/A

As shown in Table 4, many states have bifurcated their support by
ratifying a primary convention but declining to ratify the convention's
associated liability rules. The Basel Convention is the most notable example.
It has been ratified by 168 states (including all the OECD member states
except South Korea and the United States) and entered into force in 1992,
while its associated liability protocol has been ratified by only eight states
and has not entered into force. By postponing discussion of tort liability
rules to a subsequent agreement or protocol, parties to the underlying primary treaty undoubtedly have an easier time reaching consensus on the
initial issues of governmental coordination, but the postponement is usually
131
Removing the teeth from the initial negofatal for the liability rules.
tiation only serves to sharpen the bite of the liability discussions.
The most likely reason for this difference in support between primary
treaties and liability rules is the difference in the depth of the obligations
imposed. Primary treaties often contain shallow commitments with which
states can easily comply. 132 Commitments might include record keeping,
monitoring, reporting, consultation, and adherence to broad principles, such
as the principle of "equitable and reasonable utilization" of shared waterways
in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
133
Primary treaties usually contain rudimentary
International Watercourses.
dispute resolution procedures and weak or nonexistent enforcement mechanisms. In many cases, they impose requirements with which states have

130.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000).
131.
See Brunnee, supra note 1, at 359 (noting that primary treaties have often "deliberately side-step[ped] responsibility or liability issues, emphasizing instead various strategies to
promote compliance").
132.
See David G. Victor, Enforcing International Law: Implications for an Effective Global
Warming Regime, 10 DUKE ENVfL. L. & POL'Y F. 147, 152 (1999).
133.
Supra note 127, arts. 5-6.
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already complied individually. 134 From the perspective of regime formation, then, the negotiation process for primary treaties is often "a joint
effort to discover an agreement marked by harmony or simple coordination. Unsurprisingly, many agreements result, participation in those agreements is high, the lowest common denominator reigns, and compliance
.ts near1y penect.
.c
ul35
George Downs and colleagues have defined a treaty's depth as "the
extent to which [the treaty] requires states to depart from what they would
136
have done in its absence."
The substantive obligations of the liability
treaties tend to be deep because the treaties raise the prospect of higher
insurance premiums, enforceable tort judgments, and multimillion dollar
damage awards against domestic firms. The operation of domestic court
systems, after all, is one of the core aspects of national sovereignty. Deep
treaties, involving substantial infringements on sovereignty and national
freedom of action, are rare in international environmental law. Sovereignty is jealously guarded, and once an ecological problem is identified,
states are in most cases inclined to adopt modest programs with high
symbolic value:
Especially in liberal democracies, where public opinion is both fickle
and essential to political survival, governments are constantly on the
prowl for actions that have low short-term costs and high symbolic
value. When under pressure to deal with an international environmental problem that could have high short-term costs and distant
international benefits, politicians are politically wise to sidestep by
signing a treaty that is superficially significant but actually requires
137
little action.

The substantive obligations in civil liability treaties clearly go beyond
mere symbolism. As new liability treaties have been proposed and negotiated
over the past few decades, a kind of default model for a civil liability treaty
has emerged that is quite stringent. The model is designed to implement the
134.
See Victor, supra note 132, at 153 (noting that the United States was a major supporter of
the London Dumping Convention of 1972, which banned ocean dumping of radioactive wastes,
because the United States had already passed national legislation to that effect).
135.
Id. at 155-56; see also Merrill, supra note 76, at 974 (noting that many international
negotiations are "aligned interest" situations, where "if some mechanism can be devised for inducing mutual cooperation, the situation is potentially a positive-sum game for all").
136.
See George W. Downs et a!., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, SO lNT'L ORO. 379, 383 (1996). For a treaty that required reductions in pollution
levels or in tariffs, for example, the treaty's depth would refer "to the reduction it required relative
to the counterfactual estimate of the tariff or pollution level that would exist in the absence of a
treaty." Id.
13 7.
Victor, supra note 132, at 154.
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polluter pays principle by establishing a high limit of financial liability,
mandating insurance coverage up to the limit of liability, and providing for
138
All of the recent
strict liability of operators for environmental damage.
139
But the attraccivil liability treaties have incorporated these provisions.
tions of implementing broader tort remedies for transboundary environmental damage are precisely the features that make regime formation
so difficult, as these deep features of civil liability treaties would be expected
to generate intense opposition from some states. Indeed, since 2000, new
data has become available that suggest that the default model of recent civil
liability treaties is not acceptable to large groups of states in both the developed and the developing worlds.
b.

Self-Reporting by States on Reasons for Nonratification

The new data on reasons for nonratification are contained in answers
submitted by numerous states to questionnaires distributed between 2000
and 2006 by treaty secretariats for the Basel Liability Protocol, the Lugano
Convention, and the CRTD Convention. The secretariats, concerned
about the slow pace of ratification and the lack of support for the civil
liability treaties they are charged with overseeing, posed specific questions about the reasons for nonratification and about domestic liability law
140
and insurance mechanisms.
Questionnaires were distributed to signatories of each convention and to nonsignatories that were members of a relevant governing body, such as the Inland Transport Committee of the
141
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe in the case of the CRTD Convention.
In a public document, of course, states may not reveal their true
motivations for nonratification. Because of this possibility, and the brevity
138.
See Churchill, supra note 10, at 32-40 (outlining the components of the default model).
See, e.g., Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43, at arts. 4, 14, Annex B; CRTD
139.
Convention, supra note 44, at arts. 5, 9.
140.
For a list of questions asked, see Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous
Goods, Geneva, Switz., May 7-11, 2001, Follow up of the Convention on Civil Liability for
Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation
Vessels (CRTD), U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.15/2001/17 (Feb. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/wpl52001-17e.pdf; Basel Liability Protocol,
Workshops, Questionnaire 1, http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops {last visited
Nov. 10, 2007).
141.
The secretariat for the Basel Liability Protocol convened a series of workshops in
Argentina, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Poland to bring states together to discuss
their reasons for nonratification of that civil liability treaty. Basel Liability Protocol, Regional
Workshops Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on Liability and
Compensation, [hereinafter Regional Workshops], http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops
{last visited Nov. 3, 2007).
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and diversity of responses, I have not attempted a statistical analysis of all
the responses. But the responses do illustrate what states (or certain bureaucracies) choose to reveal about their motivations.
The responses reveal that the two most common objections to the
treaties were: (1) the limits of liability in the treaties are too high, and ( 2}
there are no insurance products available domestically that could cover the
high limits of liability. These two objections are closely linked because most
of the recent civil liability treaties mandate that operators of the targeted
142
Table
activity obtain insurance coverage up to the relevant liability limit.
5 gives some examples of liability limits in recent treaties. SDR refers to
143
Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund.

142.
The Basel Liability Protocol, for example, requires that strict liability for damage must be
covered by "insurance, bonds or other financial guarantees" for amounts at least equal to liability
caps in the treaty. Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43, at an. 14; see also Michael Tsimplis,
Liability and Compensation in the International Transport of Hazardous Wastes by Sea: The 1999
Protocol w the Basel Convention, 16 INT'L). MARINE & COASTAL L., 295, 321 (June 2001).
143.
The conversion from SDR to U.S. dollars is provided on the IMF's web site: International
Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).
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TABLE 5: LIABILITY LIMITS IN RECENT CIVIL LIABILITY TREATIES
Treaty

Liability Limit

CRTD Convention (1989)

Accidents caused by road or rail carriers:
SDR 18 million ($27.18 million)
Accidents caused by inland navigation vessels:
144
SDR 8 million ($12.01 million)

Lugano Convention on Civil Liability
for Damage Resulting from Activities
Dangerous to the Environment (1993)

No liability limit specified

HNS Convention (1996)

Small ships: SDR 10 million ($15.1 million)
145
Large ships: SDR 100 million ($151 million)

Basel Liability Protocol (1999)

Upper liability limit: none
(left to domestic law)
Minimum liability limit: between SDR
1 million ($1.5 million) and SDR
30 million ($46 million) depending
on the size of the waste shipment'""

Protocol on Civil Liability and
Compensation for Damage Caused
by the T ransboundary Effects
of Industrial Accidents on
T ransboundary Waters ( 2003)

Between SDR 10 million ($15.1 million) and
SDR 40 million ($60.4 million) depending
on the toxicity and amount of hazardous
147
substances released

Many states, including developed countries, reported to the treaty
secretariats that the liability limits are simply too high. The Netherlands,
for example, reported in its response to the questionnaire from the CRTD
secretariat that one reason it had not ratified that treaty was that the requisite insurance coverage "cannot be obtained on the present insurance
market .... The current limits of liability [in the treaty] are considered to
144.
CRID Convention, supra note 44, at arr. 9.
145.
HNS Convention, supra note 44, at an. 9.
146.
Basel Liability Protocol, supra note 43, at Annex B.
147.
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Protocol on Civil Uability and
Compensation far Damage Caused by the Transboumlary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary
Waters, Annex II, May 21, 2003, UNECE Doc. MT/WAT/2003/1-CP.TEIN2003/3, available at
http://www.unece.org/env/civil-liabiliry/documents/protocol_e.pdf.
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148

be too high as long as they are combined with compulsory insurance."
Finland expressed that "retaining the requirement of compulsory insurance
up to liability limits would in all probability result in small carriers not
being able to obtain insurance cover, at least not with reasonably priced
149
premiums."
For the Basel Liability Protocol, Poland stated that the
minimum limits of liability "could be considered too high for entrepre~
150
neurs in Poland."
Other nations that stated they had problems with the
liability limits under the Basel Liability Protocol included Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mozambique, Serbia,
Slovakia, and Turkey.
The objection from developed states that insurance policies cannot
be obtained is difficult to take at face value. In the developed world, billion
dollar risks and assets are routinely insured, so it should not be impossible
to obtain cover for a narrow class of risks running in the tens of millions
of dollars. Developed states may be more concerned about the added cost
of insurance premiums, rather than the uninsurability of the damages per se.
Lack of insurance products might be a larger problem in developing coun~
tries, which were especially likely to state that they had not ratified one
or more of the civil liability treaties because insurance products that could
148.
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods
by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, Switz., May 7-11, 2001, Replies
by the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, 2-3, U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.15/2001/17/Add.2 (Feb.
23, 200 1), available at http://www .unece.org/trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/wp 15 200 1-1 7a2e. pdf; see
also Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, Switz., Reply by Turkey, 2,
U.N.Doc. TRANS/WP.15/2001/17/Add.5 (Aug. 16, 2001), available at http://www.unece.org/
trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/wp152001-17a5e.pdf ("(T]he amount of the premium to be paid for
the possible damages [that] dangerous goods and liquid fuels might cause would reach very high
amounts .... In fact, it is understood that other organizations and administrations do not have this
kind of insurance either.").
149.
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods
by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, Switz., Nov. 5-9, 2001, Replies by
Finland and Uthuania, 2, U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.15/2001/17/Add. 4 (July 20, 2001), available at
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/wp152001-17a4e.pdf [hereinafter Replies by Finland
and Uthuania]; see also Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva, Switz., Nov. 5-9, 2001, Reply
by Belgium 3-4, U.N. Doc. TRANS/WP.15/2001/17/Add.8 (Sept. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.unece.org/trans/danger/publi/crtd/doc/wp152001-17a8f.pdf ("The limitation on liability
appears too high for transporters .... There are special concerns about obtaining insurance coverage, for a reasonable premium in a very limited insurance market. From the point of view of the
insurers, the limits of liability on transporters remain high and do not provide the insurer sufficient
protection. These amounts are economically unbearable for small and medium-sized enterprises.")
(translated from the French original).
150.
See Regional Workshop Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on
Liability and Compensation, Warsaw, Pol., Jan. 18-20, 2006, Poland-Financial Limits and
Insurance, available at http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops/poland/poland-q3.doc.

888

55 UCLA LAW REVIEW 837 (2008)

cover the liability limits were simply not available. Ghana's response to the
Basel Liability Protocol qnestionnaire was typical: "Currently in Ghana,
there are no conventional insurance policies available to cover the liabili151
ties specified .... "
Tanzania was even more explicit: "[The] [p]rivate
insurance sector in the country [is] not ready to take up [the] risk of hazard152
ous wastes. "
Other countries responding to the Basel secretariat that the
lack of available insurance products was an obstacle to ratification included
Cambodia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Estonia, Indonesia, Lesotho, Malaysia,
153
Mozambique, Peru, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia.
Another major reported reason for opposition to the treaties, especially
from developed states, was the incompatibility of the treaties with domestic
liability law. In questionnaire responses for the Lugano Convention, numerous countries, including the United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, Greece,
Turkey, and Switzerland, pointed to conflicts with domestic law as a major
154
reason for refusing to sign or ratify the treaty.
The U.K., for example,
listed five objections to the Lugano Convention, including that "[t]here
are elements of joint and several liability, which has generally been
rejected in the United Kingdom, where a proportionate approach is more
155
usual."
Sweden noted that the Convention's definition of compensable
damage "goes beyond what has been generally accepted in tort legislation
since the Convention includes a right for compensation for impairment of
.
,!56
t h e envuonment per se.
In developing countries, a common reported roadblock to ratification of
the Basel Liability Protocol and the CRTD Convention was a lack of general
domestic legal capacity to implement complex liability schemes. The treaties
151.
Regional Workshop Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on Liability
and Compensation, Addis Ababa, Eth., Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2004, Ghana-Financial limits and Insurance,
available at http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops/ethiopia/financial-limits-ghana%20.doc.
152.
Regional Workshop Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on Liability
and Compensation, Addis Ababa, Eth., Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2004, Responses of Participant Countries to
the Questionnaires, 15, available at http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops/ethiopia/answersquest.doc [hereinafter Responses of Participant Countries].
See Regional Workshops, supra note 141.
153.
154.
See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Responses to the Questionnaire on
the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting From Activities Dangerous to the Environment
(Lugano Convention), U.N. Doc. MP.WAT/2001/2CP.TEIA/2001/2 (May 1, 2001), available at
http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2001/wat/mp.wat.2001.2.e.pdf.
155.
Id. at 7.
156.
Id. at 6. Summarizing the responses to the Lugano Convention questionnaire, the
Technical Group of Experts on Liability and Redress for the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol noted that
states felt that the scope of the Lugano Convention was "too wide and gives too little legal certainty,
and that its definitions, especially in the field of environmental damage, are too vague." See
Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 56, at 9.
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require changes to domestic liability law that may necessitate passage of
conforming statutes, issuance of new insurance regulations, and training
of judges and lawyers. For developing countries with overstretched or inadequate legal systems, such requirements appear to be beyond their capacity
or may conflict with other national priorities. As Zambia forthrightly
acknowledged, its law enforcement agents "are not alive to their legal
· un d er envuonmenta
·
l l aw. " 157 Bosnta
· ' s response to t h e Base l
d uttes
Liability Protocol secretariat stated that it could not ratify the treaty
because it "has [no] environmental Legislation at the state level, [no] real
Ministry of Environment and state environmental set-up, structures and
158
human capacities for implementation."
Mauritius listed a litany of capacity problems, many of which were mentioned by other nations, such as lack
of "staff, know-how/expertise, access to information ... communication
tools, detection methods, [and] availability of emergency response equip159
ment .... " Other nations that listed capacity to implement as an obstacle
to ratification of the Basel Liability Protocol included Bosnia, Botswana,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Moldova, Poland,
160
Romania, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovakia, and Uganda.
What do these responses tell us about the utility of the Extended Model
outlined above? It is not surprising that the national responses do not
explicitly state that protection of domestic firms from transnational lawsuits
was a reason for nonratification of the treaties. The responses do, however,
illustrate the centrality of domestic concerns and the careful guarding of
sovereign prerogatives to set national liability law. The responses also
highlight that civil liability treaties can impose costs on firms even in the
absence of any transnational lawsuit brought pursuant to the treaties. These
near-term costs include obtaining insurance policies, payment of insurance premiums, and adapting to changes in domestic law and procedures.
A state deciding whether to ratify a civil liability treaty therefore must weigh
both the near-term and long-term costs against any benefits to be gained
through ratification.
The questionnaire responses are most useful as guidance for building stronger tort remedies in the future. If lack of insurance products in
157.
Regional Workshop Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on Liability
and Compensation, Addis Ababa, Eth., Aug. 30-Sept. 2, 2004, Zambia-Ratification, available at
http://www.basel.int/legalmatters/regworkshops/ethiopia/q2-Zambia.doc.
158.
Regional Workshop Aimed at Promoting Ratification of the Basel Protocol on Liability
and Compensation, Warsaw, Pol., Jan. 18-20, 2006, Bosnia-Ratification, available at http://www.basel.int/
legalmatters/regworkshops/poland/bosnia-q2.doc.
Responses of Participant Countries, supra note 152, at 10.
159.
160.
See Regional Workshops, supra note 141.
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developing states is a roadblock to treaty ratification or implementation, then
this obstacle might be transformed into a business opportunity for insurance
providers. If the relatively stringent models of civil liability treaties used in
the past are deemed objectionable by most states, then we need to consider
whether consensus could form around less stringent models, with terms that
would appeal to a wider coalition of parties. And if implementation capacity
in developing states is an obstacle, then we should consider capacity assistance, which has become common in other kinds of international environ161
mental treaties.
Past failures should serve as a springboard for developing
a new vision of the role of tort remedies in international environmental law.

III.

THOUGHTS ON REFORM

Despite the litany of past problems in building successful civil liability
regimes, there is still a pressing need to strengthen tort remedies for
transboundary environmental damage. The lack of viable legal remedies
for victims of transboundary pollution is a glaring and longstanding hole
in international environmental law, and private law solutions, which can
address transboundary problems without resort to dispute resolution among
governments, are urgently needed.
Each environmental risk is different in terms of its character, magnitude, and the states affected, so no single policy, treaty, or declaration will
suffice to strengthen tort remedies for transboundary environmental damage. Multiple approaches are needed, operating on numerous legal fronts.
This Part discusses how we can learn from the past four decades of efforts
and begin to reform the international approach to this area of law. The
solutions proposed here fall into two broad categories: those that reform
the process and substance of civil liability treaties, with the aim of
resuscitating consent-based treaty regimes; and those that look outside the
treaty system toward bottom-up approaches that will strengthen tort remedies through the spread of liability norms.
These two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Successful conclusion
of future civil liability treaties can help to strengthen informal norms
governing transboundary damage, and at the same time the emergence of
norms through a variety of domestic and international interactions can
provide an impetus for states to negotiate and implement treaties.
Nevertheless, for clarity it makes sense to discuss these two approaches
separately, as they involve different actors and strategies.
161.

See HUNTER, SALZMAN, & ZAELKE, supra note 51, at 430--37.
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Reform Within the Treaty System

Civil liability treaties should continue to be one focus of efforts to
strengthen tort remedies for transboundary environmental damage because
they carry the imprimatur of state consent. Consent not only lends legiti,
macy to a regime, but it also indicates that important domestic political
actors within a state believe that the treaty is in the state's interest, which
162
assists long-term implementation.
International environmental liabil,
ity law is a field requiring close coordination among national governments
and among domestic courts, justice ministries, and other legal actors.
Obtaining consensus on the terms and conditions of tort liability through
a treaty, and then implementing that treaty after a process of state
ratification, will remain one of the primary means of achieving and sus,
taining that level of coordination.
How can widespread state consent to new civil liability treaties be
secured? If developed and developing states have in the past con,
eluded that their interests are best secured through remaining outside
civil liability regimes, is there any hope for altering incentives in favor
of regime formation?
Regime design is an area of increasing overlap between international
law and international relations scholarship, as it focuses on what legal
structures or rules will best promote international cooperation and, ulti,
163
mately, effectiveness in solving joint problems.
One way to improve
regime design in the civil liability field is to identify different structural
arrangements that would lower the costs of joining civil liability regimes.
State concerns about near,term or long,term risks to domestic firms could be
alleviated through a variety of mechanisms. For example, liability limits in
the treaties could be lowered to reduce the exposure of individual firms.
This would likely reduce insurance premiums and increase the prospects
for more widespread adherence. Treaty negotiators should look closely at
how liability caps can be used as a flexible means of meeting demands that
culpable firms be held accountable through tort while at the same time
addressing competitiveness concerns that the liability will become crushing
for individual firms. The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
is moving toward lowering liability limits in the CRTD Convention, which
162.
See Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32
CASE W. RES. J. lNT'L L. 387, 405--09 (2000) ("Some scholats have suggested that the legitimacy of
the process of rule creation itself is a central factor in explaining compliance.").
163.
See George W. Downs eta!., The Transformational Model of International Regime Design:
Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. ). TRANSNAT'L L. 465, 470 (2000).
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has not entered into force nearly twenty years after its adoption in 1989. In
2003, the UNECE began to consider a new draft of the treaty that lowered
164
liability limits by as much as fifty percent.
Another approach for enhancing regime formation in the civil liability field is to move toward layered legal structures that combine liability
targeted on a single culpable party with compensation funds to which a
variety of players in a risk-producing industry contribute. The oil spill
165
and nuclear liability regimes both incorporate such funds, as does the
166
HNS Convention.
A plaintiff's access to the pooled funds could be
triggered only if damages exceed a defendant's individual liability limit, so that
some liability exposure would remain for a responsible party as a deterrent to
harmful activities. Details of compensation funds would need to be worked
out for various treaties, including the maximum payments from a fund, the
methods of contribution, the organizational structure of the entity that
167
manages the fund, and the procedures for making claims.
But the concept of a lower liability limit for individual firms, combined with establishment of a compensation fund that would spread risks, is an attractive
means of securing more widespread acceptance and ratification of civil
liability rules.
To be sure, compensation funds somewhat dilute the deterrent incentives of tort. Responsible actors as well as bad actors within an industry
would all be required to contribute to the fund. With resort to the fund,
culpable parties would not be held fully and individually responsible for any
damage they cause. But similar issues exist for liability schemes that allow
for the purchase of liability insurance. Coverage by liability insurance presents its own moral hazard problems, diluting individual incentives for
precaution and spreading losses to actors that did not themselves contribute
168
Yet we deem liability insurance essential to ensuring
to the damage.
164.
See O:mvention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Nov. 3-4, 2003, Consolidated Text of a
Draft New CRTD as Adopted by the Ad Hoc Meeting of Experts far Consideration by the Inland Transport
Committee, U.N. Doc. TRANS/AC.8/8/Add.1 (Nov. 24, 2003), available at http://www.unece.org/
trans/doc/2003/ac8/TRANS-AC8-08a1e.pdf.
165.
See International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 27, 1992, reprinted in LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 CONVENTIONS AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY
FuND PROTOCOL 25 (2005), available at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/ Conventions%20English.pdf.
Supra note 44, at arts. 13-36.
166.
See Sean D. Murphy, Prospective Uability Regimes far the Transboundary Movement of
167.
Hazardous Wastes, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 24, 58 (1994 ); Daniel, supra note 10, at 240.
168.
The literature on moral hazard in insurance and tort law is voluminous. For prominent
examples, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcON.
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adequate compensation for injured parties and often mandate it by law.
Moreover, even if lowered liability limits or the availability of a compensation fund did dilute deterrence incentives, the negative consequences
would be offset by countervailing factors. There would be an increased
chance of treaty ratification as well as increased prospects for compensation for individuals injured by transboundary harms, due to the presence of pooled funds.
Liability rules for transboundary environmental damage can, of course,
be diluted too far. At the extreme, liability caps could be lowered to a
few thousand dollars, strict liability could be abolished, and no funds would
be available as a back-up source of compensation. Such a treaty might be
viewed as ideal by states committed to protecting liability walls for their
domestic firms. At best this kind of treaty would be mere symbolism, and
more likely it would represent a giant step backward for strengthening the
role of tort in international environmental law. The possibility of a parade
of horribles involving underdeterrence should not preclude treaty negotiators from seeking terms and conditions that would be more palatable to states,
however. There is a clear trade-off, which needs to be recognized, between
the stringency of terms in a civil liability treaty and its prospects for
political acceptance.
Apart from adjusting the substance of civil liability treaties, progress in
strengthening tort remedies through treaties can also be accomplished
through procedural reforms. Recall Table 2, depicting directly conflicting
interests of states in the Extended Model and the resulting prediction of
deadlock in a hypothetical negotiation over liability rules. If the only issues
being negotiated involve liability-who can be sued and how much will be
paid-the discussions can easily become a zero-sum game. 169
To break the impasse, negotiators should look outside the narrow
confines of the liability box to introduce a broader range of nonliability
issues into the negotiating mix, providing some basis for integrative
170
bargaining. The basic reform here is what Lawrence Susskind of MIT and
REV. 941 (1963); Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection,
80 J. POL. EcON. 623 (1972); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541
(1979). For a historical overview of the role of moral hazard in insurance, see Tom Baker, On the
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
See supra Part II.B.l.
169.
170.
Integrative bargaining involves a shared search for options, focusing on the underlying
interests of parties, whereas distributive bargaining, which has heretofore been the norm in liability
discussions, focuses more on the positions and relative political strength of the parties. See Nancy D.
Erbe, Appreciating Mediation's Global Role in Promoting Good Governance, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
355,388 (2006); Young, supra note 71, at 361.
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the Harvard Program on Negotiation has called "issue linkage," a variation
of the classic political strategy of logrolling: "You give me something that I
171
want very much, and I will give you something important in exchange."
What other nonliability issues should be introduced into the mix?
Side deals could involve related environmental issues (such as treaty governance, technical assistance, or emissions control requirements) or unrelated
issues, such as trade concessions, security arrangements, or political support
in international fora. A developing state might agree, for example, to votes
on certain U.N. Security Council resolutions in exchange for the cooperation of developed states on the terms and conditions of environmental
liability rules. A state concerned about its exposure to a specific type of
transboundary environmental risk might agree to a lower liability cap in
exchange for more substantive obligations by industrialized states in the
realms of prevention, safety equipment, or technical assistance. The effect
of this kind of issue linkage is that states may reconceive their selfinterest as they consider a broader package of issues, rather than liability
rules in isolation.
Negotiating civil liability rules for environmental damage in smaller,
regional fora may also help to facilitate a consensus that can stick through
the ratification and implementation processes. Reducing the number of parties at the table not only reduces transaction costs involved in drafting an
agreement, but may also increase the prospects for regime formation if the
parties have similar economies and legal systems. Regional agreements may
also help to overcome a reluctance to ratify civil liability rules that involve
mutual recognition of judgments.
A regional approach to transnational environmental liability issues has
been implemented successfully in Nordic countries, following adoption of a
liability regime over thirty years ago. 172 More recently, the European Union
adopted a Directive on environmental liability that applies to all twentyseven Member States.m The primary goal of the Directive is to establish liability rules for hazardous waste spills, wetland destruction, and other

171.

LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENviRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING MORE EFFECTIVE

GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 91 (1994).

See Convention on the Protection of the Environment Between Denmark, Finland,
172.
Norway, and Sweden, Feb. 19, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 591. For more information on the role of this convention in transboundary disputes, see Phillips, supra note 30.
173.
Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April2004
on Environmental Liability With Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental
Damage, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56 [hereinafter Directive].
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174

environmental harms within Member States.
Its language on transboundary
175
environmental damage is vague, and it will likely be several years before
the Directive is applied to an incident where the damage is located in one
Member State and the actor causing the damage is located in another.
Nevertheless, it remains the most recent example of crafting and implementing supranational liability rules for environmental damage.
As much as politics and regime design matter for strengthening tort
remedies in international environmental law, we should not forget the role
of unpredictable, exogenous events as a spur to regime formation. Major
accidents involving significant loss of life and economic disruption across
borders can highlight the absence of legal remedies and the need for an
176
agreement on the liability rules that will govern such disasters.
Indeed,
past regimes were often formed or strengthened in the wake of massive
accidents with transboundary consequences. The 1967 Torrey Canyon spill
highlighted the inadequacies of then-existing legal liability instruments
for oil spills and led to the rapid negotiation of the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention. 177 The nuclear liability regime was strengthened in the 1990s
following the 1986 Chernobyl accident, 178 and the release of cyanide wastes
into the Danube from the Baia Mare mine in Romania in 2000 led directly
to negotiations on a liability protocol governing transboundary industrial
accidents in Europe. 179 These types of incidents can serve as focusing events

174.
The Directive applies to damages to unique environmental resources such as protected
species, habitats, and waters. See id. It does not apply to more traditional forms of damages such
as property damage and health damage. For an analysis of the Directive's drafting history, see
Chris Clarke, The Proposed EC Liability Directive: Half-Way Through Co-Decision, 12 REV. EUR.
COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 254 (2003 ).
175.
In exploring the need for a new directive, the European Commission initially pointed
to transboundary environmental damage as a primary reason why environmental liability needed to
be addressed at the Community level, rather than within individual Member States. See White
Paper on Environmental Uability, at 25-26, COM (2000) 66 final (Feb. 9, 2000), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/liability/pdf/el_full.pdf. However, the Directive itself refers only
to consultation among Member States and possible intervention by the Commission in the event of
transboundary damage that affects several Member States. See Directive, supra note 173, at art. 15.
176.
As Oran Young has noted, exogenous events help to overcome the "logjam" in which
negotiations bog down in a "sparting match" of jockeying for positional advantage. Young, supra
note 71, at 371-72.
177.
Michael Faure & Wang Hui, Economic Analysis of Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage,
37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 179, 179 (2006).
178.
See Varda Lamm, The Protocol Amending the 1963 Vienna Convention, in International
Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period (OECD and IAEA 2006), available at www.nea.fr/
html/law/chernobyl/LAMM.pdf.
179.
See Stephen Stec et al., Transboundary Environmental Governance and the Baia Mare Cyanide
Spill, 27 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 639 (2001 ).
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that raise pressure on political elites to negotiate a legal response, elevating
180
environmental liability issues on the international environmental agenda.
B.

Reform Outside the Treaty System

While state consent lends legitimacy to treaty-based regimes once the
regime is established, obtaining this consent has also emerged, as we have
seen, as the primary obstacle to regime formation. The requirement of consent has derailed most of the treaties listed in Table 1, as they have not
attracted sufficient ratifications to enter into force, even after years of labor
to draft a treaty text. The reforms discussed above will improve the prospects for forming workable regimes, but given the track record of civil
liability treaties, these reforms cannot be the complete solution.
A top-down approach of multilateral treaty making among governments, followed by implementation of the treaties through domestic law, is
not the only method of generating international legal cooperation in this
area of law. The other major avenue for strengthening tort remedies in
international environmental law is a bottom-up approach that would rely
on transnational networks of citizens, government officials, NGOs, and
attorneys to push for changes in domestic and international law that would
facilitate redress for transboundary environmental damage. Such a decentralized strategy could have two beneficial impacts. It could lead to the
emergence of norms regarding liability for transboundary pollution that
could take root entirely outside any treaty-making process, even in the face
of continued recalcitrance by powerful states. It could also lead to modification of state preferences from within and, ultimately, prompt renewed
governmental efforts to codify liability norms and principles in treaties.
A norm-based strategy would be grounded in intellectual traditions,
such as constructivism and the legal process school, which contend that state
preferences are often highly contingent and can be shaped through domestic politics, transnational interactions, norm internalization, and changing
181
In these traditions, a state's preferences are not viewed
cultural identities.
180.
See ]OHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 94-95
(2d ed. 1995).
181.
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Address, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L.
REv. 623 (1992) (arguing that states comply with international law mainly because of norm
internalization in the social, political, and legal spheres); John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the
World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT'L ORG. 855
(1998) (criticizing realists and institutionalists for their assumption that state identities are "given
and fixed" and arguing that identities and interests are instead "socially constructed"); Alexander
Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG.
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as antecedent to its interactions with other states in the international sys182
tem; preferences are in fact shaped through that interaction, as well
as through a complex domestic dialogue of actors. If "what states want" is
socially constructed, then opportunities arise to shape the political, legal,
and social landscape that gives rise to these preferences.
Both constructivism and legal process schools highlight the importance of norms (as opposed to formal treaties or sanctions) in shaping
how states behave. In extensive writing on norm-based theories of international law, Harold Hongju Koh has argued that international norms
. 1 1ega1 process,"183 a comp1ex mterp
.
1ay of
emerge t hrough a "transnauona
governmental and nongovernmental actors engaging in "vertical strategies
184
of interaction, interpretation, and internalization."
According to Koh,
185
Norms can
norms can be "uploaded" from domestic to internationallaw.
also be "downloaded" from international law into domestic law (such as the
norm against disappearance), as social, political, and legal actors gradually
accept the legitimacy of an international norm and promote its adoption into
186
Norms can also be "horizontally transplanted"
domestic policy and law.
187
one
national
legal
system
to another.
International norms have a
from
direct policy effect if they are codified into domestic law, but they can also
have indirect policy effects as tools in the hands of advocates to criticize
governments, mobilize public opinion, and prevent backsliding on inter188
national commitments.
To strengthen private remedies for transboundary environmental
damage outside of a process of treaty ratification, several norms would need
to emerge. One norm would support procedural access to justice for foreign plaintiffs seeking remedies in the courts of the source state where the
391, 398 (1992) (arguing that state actors do not have a "portfolio" of interests that they carry
around with them in inter-state interactions, and that they instead "define their interests in the
process of defining situations").
182.
See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004) (explaining the role of acculturation, "the general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the
surrounding culture," in the development of international human rights law).
183.
Koh, supra note 67, at 2655-56.
Id.
184.
185.
See Koh, supra note 181, at 642-43; see also Koh, supra note 42, at 746.
Koh, supra note 42, at 746.
186.
187.
Id.
188.
Harold Koh has identified three possible routes through which international norms
become internalized into domestic systems: social, political, and legal internalization. Only legal
internalization involves direct codification into law. The other two routes involve the population
at large or political elites adhering to a norm because they believe it has legitimacy. Koh, supra
note 67, at 2656-57.
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harm originated; another would support domestic court jurisdiction over
foreign entities causing internal damage. 189 More broadly, tort remedies will
play a larger role in international environmental governance only if a "logic
190
of appropriateness" emerges in which states (and domestic courts) begin to
confront transboundary tortfeasors with a realistic prospect of tort liability
and payment of damages. These norms would not have the specificity of a
formal civil liability treaty, and they may lack uniform content regarding
minimum or maximum damages and the standard of liability, but they
would have the advantages of flexibility and the ability to take root across
diverse legal cultures-"transform[ing], mutat[ing], and percolat[ing] up and
down, from the public to the private, from the domestic to the international
level and back down again." 191
How might these norms emerge? One mechanism could be through
the coordinated activities of what Koh has called "transnational norm
entrepreneurs" (TNEs), which he defines as nonstate actors who seek to
192
mobilize public opinion and change government policy.
Acting as TNEs,
NGOs in several different countries could push for reforms to domestic
law to facilitate redress for transboundary environmental damage. NGOs
might advocate, for example, for elimination of laws and procedures that
discriminate against foreign plaintiffs suing in local courts. Or, they might
advocate for the equivalent of national long arm statutes or judiciallycreated effects tests that would allow municipal courts to assume jurisdiction
over foreign defendants who cause injury inside the territory. In alliance
with governments, TNEs could support issuance of declarations in international fora regarding guiding principles for tort remedies for transboundary
environmental damage.
Firms concerned about competitiveness may also act as TNEs, pressuring their own governments to establish more harmonized rules for tort
liability. For example, a series of ad hoc domestic judgments in tort suits
relating to environmental damage, resulting in contradictory decision rules
189.
Norms on non-discriminatory access to justice are already emerging in international declarations and conventions. See, e.g., Rio Declaration, supra note 16, at princ. 10; U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, supra note 127, at art. 32.
190.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A
Prospectus, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 16, 33 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004) (defining the
"logic of appropriateness" as an inquiry by an actor into the correctness of behavior "consistent with
that actor's identity or sense of self').
191.
Harold Hongju Koh, Lecture, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 184 (1996).
192.
Koh, supra note 181, at 647-48; see also Young, supra note 71, at 364 ("[I)t would be a
serious mistake to overlook the role of transnational alliances among influential interest groups in
developing and maintaining regimes at the international level.").
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and widely varying damages, may prompt firms to advocate for more uniform rules (likely including liability caps) that would be negotiated
internationally by governments.
One successful example of nonstate TNEs working on transboundary
pollution issues is the Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal
Access Act (UTPRAA), which lowers liability walls between the United
States and Canada by specifying choice of law rules in transboundary suits.
The UTPRAA had its origins in a joint report by the Canadian and
American Bar Associations and was approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Uniform Conference of
Canada in 1982 as a vehicle for the "the equalization of rights and remedies of citizens in Canada and the U.S.A. affected by pollution emanating
193
from the other jurisdiction." The UTPRAA was implemented not through
a bilateral treaty, but rather through direct adoptions in U.S. state legisla194
tures and Canadian provincial legislatures, in effect bypassing national
consent to create law at the subnational level. It can serve as a model for
how like-minded attorneys and activists in different nations can cooperate
horizontally and vertically to generate legal norms on transboundary
pollution, without a formal treaty.
Activists seeking stronger remedies for transboundary environmental
damage could also push states to adopt self-help remedies in the absence
of formal intergovernmental cooperation. Two scholars recently argued
that Ontario should revise domestic legislation to make it easier to sue
U.S. firms in Ontario courts for transboundary air pollution damage. 195
Citizens concerned about hazards from the international transport of hazardous substances could push their own states to enact domestic legislation
requiring payment of port fees or posting of bonds by hazardous cargo carriers,
or states could enact environmental taxes to ensure that funds are available
for environmental response in the event of a toxic release. Past scholarship
has largely overlooked the potential for states to enact unilateral remedies as
a response to transboundary risks. Such remedies are attractive because they
are enacted pursuant to domestic law and require no intergovernmental
negotiations, but their role is somewhat limited because they would need to
193.
See Michael I. Jeffrey, Transboundary Pollution and Cross-Border Remedies, 18 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 173, 177 (1992) (quoting Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act, prefatory
note at 5).
194.
The Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act has been adopted by seven
U.S. states (Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, and Wisconsin) and
three Canadian provinces (Manitoba, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island). See list of adoptions at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusVuniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utpraa.asp.
See Hsu & Parrish, supra note 39.
195.
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be based on a background condition of jurisdiction. They are appropriate
only for classes of transboundary environmental risks, such as imports of
hazardous materials, where the state affected by the risk has some legal
jurisdiction over the entity producing the risk.
International norms governing transboundary environmental damage
may also emerge through rulings of international tribunals and domestic
courts. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), for example, is now hear,
ing a complaint brought by Argentina challenging Uruguay's construction
196
of two paper mills on the River Uruguay.
If the ICJ rules on the merits,
this will become one of only a handful of cases where the ICJ has directly
addressed rights and responsibilities surrounding transboundary envi,
197
ronmental issues.
Climate change has emerged as one of the most active areas of inter,
national environmental litigation, and norms regarding transboundary
environmental damage and the transnational procedures for seeking a rem,
edy could emerge through these cases. The past five years have seen an
explosion of litigation in domestic and international fora, including:
•

•

•

•

Suits in the United States, Germany, and Australia regarding
the application of environmental impact review statutes to
climate change impacts from new programs and projects;
A suit brought by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference against the
United States at the Inter,American Commission on Human
Rights, alleging that U.S. greenhouse gas emissions violate
Inuit human rights;
Petitions to the World Heritage Committee of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
requesting listing, as endangered, world heritage sites threatened
by climate change;
A suit pending in the Second Circuit brought by U.S. states
and environmental groups against major electricity producers

196.
Argentina's complaint alleged that the mills will irreparably damage the river ecosystem
and will hinder Argentina's rights of equitable use. The complaint also alleged that Uruguay failed to
comply with a 1975 bilateral treaty on management of the river. On January 23, 2007, the ICJ
denied Argentina's request for provisional measures (equivalent to a preliminary injunction) and
allowed construction of the mills to proceed, but Argentina is continuing to pursue its objections on
the merits. See Docket of ICJ Pending Cases, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php.
197.
The ICJ has addressed only a handful of other cases involving transboundary environmental
issues. These include the Gabcikovo-Nagyrnaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 l.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25,
1997), and the Nuclear Test Cases (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974I.C.J. 253, 267-72, 1974l.Cj. 457,472-78.
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alleging that their greenhouse gas emissions constitute a
nuisance; and
A suit pending in the Ninth Circuit brought by California
against major auto manufacturers alleging that mobile source
198
emissions of greenhouse gases constitute a nuisance.

The bodies hearing these suits may become "law-declaring fora" that
strengthen international norms on transboundary pollution through "defining, elaborating, and testing the definition of particular norms and opining
199
If U.S. courts begin to rule that greenhouse gas
about their violation."
emissions can constitute a nuisance and provide a remedy in injunction or
money damages, then a wave of domestic climate change suits will likely
follow, as well as transnational suits in U.S. courts and elsewhere, brought
by foreign entities against U.S. firms. As firms distinguish themselves as
leaders or laggards on addressing their emissions of greenhouse gases,
advocates can begin to select defendants and argue that laggards are
deviating from a standard of ordinary care regarding the global impact of
200
their emissions.
The current wave of climate litigation is a classic bottom-up legal
strategy that is occurring in tandem with the public law process of
implementing the Kyoto Protocol (outside the United States) and negotiating a successor convention. Transnational climate litigation will test
the current robustness of liability walls, as courts will undoubtedly confront novel questions of jurisdiction, remedies, enforcement of judgments,
and forum non conveniens. Even if these suits are unsuccessful, they will
nevertheless have a political impact that could be helpful in strengthening
international legal norms related to transboundary pollution. The suits
focus public attention on the fact that climate change has real victims
who can be located thousands of miles away from the major emissions
sources. Climate change may come to be viewed not just as an issue of
governance of the global commons, but rather as a series of increasingly
severe transboundary impacts, some of which will be suitable for private
law remedies.
Can the gradual spread of international norms regarding liability for
transboundary environmental damage really make a difference in the
198.
For a discussion of these cases and an overview of current trends in climate litigation,
see Hari Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational
Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789 (2005).
199.
Koh, supra note 181, at 650.
See David A. Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radicnl Idea: Tort-Based Climate Litigation,
200.
28 COLUMj. ENvrL. L. 1, 28 (2003) (discussing potential defendants in climate-related tort suits).
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outcome of actual disputes? International human rights law provides some
cause for optimism. It is perhaps the paradigmatic example of international
law that operates primarily through norm-internalization, rather than
201
through overt, treaty-based sanctions against noncomplying states.
Treaties such as the Convention Against Torture and declarations such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have contributed to the
development of international human rights law because they enunciate
clear norms and expectations viewed as legitimate by most public and pri202
vate actors, not because of formal compliance mechanisms.
Human rights
norms, once established, then become interpreted in formal judicial settings,
such as war crimes tribunals and domestic courts, and can also be used by
NGOs, attorneys, and government officials as standards by which to judge
and criticize national behavior. The spread of human rights norms cannot be
explained by self-interest alone. As Oona Hathaway has noted, "human
rights treaties impinge on core areas of national sovereignty without
203
promising obvious material or strategic benefits."
There are some crucial differences between the human rights context
and transboundary environmental damage, however. Human rights norms
against torture, slavery, and genocide have deeply rooted histories and
definitions that are widely accepted (though the debate over treatment of
suspects in terrorism cases highlights that the definitions are not universally
agreed upon). The practice of these prohibited acts sparks revulsion and
moral outrage. T ransboundary pollution, in contrast, results in most cases
from the normal functioning of economies and is unlikely to ever rise to
the level of a jus cogens peremptory norm. It is not possible to outlaw all
transboundary pollution, and there is little consensus on when transboundary
environmental damage has risen to a sufficient level of seriousness to result
in legal sanction.
Moreover, human rights norms have evolved over decades through
sustained advocacy by governments and NGOs, promotion by powerful states
and the United Nations, and a high degree of public concern. In contrast,
there are currently few transnational norm entrepreneurs promoting the
201.
See Koh, supra note 29, at 1407.
For example, the Omvention Against Torture has weak compliance and enforcement mecha202.
nisms. The dispute resolution procedures in the Convention Against Torture are cumbersome and
lengthy, involving a series of reports, investigations, and mediation by a "Committee Against Torture."
The Convention provides no significant penalties for noncomplying states. See Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, arts. 20--22, Dec. 10,
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (1984).
203.
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J.
1935, 1938 (2002).
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strengthening of tort remedies in international environmental law. It
remains a back burner issue in environment and foreign ministries. The
number of NGOs focusing on any transboundary environmental issue other
than climate change and wildlife protection remains quite small, and the
narrower issue of civil liability for transboundary environmental harm has
not been a significant agenda item for environmental activists.
For norms to emerge in this area of law, a higher degree of public
awareness and activism about tort remedies needs to evolve in the future,
perhaps by riding on the coattails of the climate change movement. The
development of international environmental law has traditionally lagged
innovations in international human rights law by one or two decades, and
public awareness will likely build over time. Indeed, a time may come when
support for viable legal remedies for transboundary pollution victims is seen
as a necessary component of a government's political, moral, and environmental leadership.
CONCLUSION

Though in its four-decade history, international environmental liability
law has been the subject of high hopes, rhetorical commitments, and
extensive negotiation, it still remains in its infancy. This Article has shown
that tort remedies can play an important role in international environmental
law by complementing our primary regulatory treaties and providing an
avenue for injured parties to seek redress. But given the track record, it is
clear that enhancing tort's role in international environmental law is far
more challenging than the use of tort litigation in domestic environmental
suits. Whereas tort preexisted environmental regulation in domestic law, in
the international sphere states are looking at adopting new liability rules
prospectively, internationalizing domestic tort rules and potentially imposing
new kinds of liability on domestic firms. States have, for the most part,
approached civil liability negotiations with reluctance, recalcitrance, and,
ultimately, rejection.
Regime theory sheds light on the reasons for the relative stasis in the
civil liability field by focusing on states' underlying interests and the role of
liability walls in protecting domestic firms. The hurdles to future cooperation
on negotiated civil liability rules are significant, but they are not insurmountable. Skilled treaty negotiators should aim to find a zone of agreement by
identifying treaty terms and legal structures that are more palatable to states.
Negotiations among states with similar economies and legal systems may
help to avoid the acrimony that has surrounded global discussions on liability.
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At the same time, attorneys and activists should continue to push for stronger
tort remedies through bottom-up strategies of litigation, advocacy, and
norm promotion.
The issue of tort's role in international environmental law is not going
away, nor should it. Liability issues continue to be debated because they
cut to the core question of whether international environmental law should
involve only governmental obligations to monitor and to prevent ecological
damage, or whether it should broaden to provide a viable remedy to citizens
when ecological damage does occur. Understanding the causes of conflict
in this area of law and implementing the reforms proposed in this Article
will help to strengthen tort remedies in the future.

